| “Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP) bring wounded United States Marines from Iwo Jima to a Landing Ship, Tank Hospital – LST(H) – for immediate triage before transfer to a hospital ship. Photo by Joe Rosenthal (October 9, 1911 – August 20, 2006). From the V Amphibious Corps After Action Report: The evacuation of casualties during this operation showed a marked improvement over any previous operations of this group. Great care had been taken in thoroughly briefing all medical personnel involved before the operation commenced and in providing special medical equipment such as whole blood, which was used here for the 1st time. 4 LST’s were outfitted for use as casualty evacuation ships and a large medical staff placed on board. Shortly after How-Hour these vessels each launched 1 3×12 barge and secured it alongside and moved to a position close to the control vessel off each regimental beach. Casualties coming from the beach, principally in DUKW’s and LVT’s, were taken aboard the barge and thence by crane to the LST where they were given early medical treatment and then evacuated to transports by LCVP’s. During the operation these 4 vessels handled an approximate total of 6,136 casualties and unquestionably contributed materially to saving many lives. The Ozark (LCV 1) proved her worth in handling of casualties. Prior to the operation extra medical personnel had been placed aboard her and on her departure she evacuated a total of 407 casualties. The lack of hospital facilities ashore was a source of constant concern because of the possibility of bad weather prohibiting embarkation of casualties. It is recommended that every effort be made, particularly in a situation such as this where no suitable harbor was available, to establish hospital facilities ashore at the earliest practicable time. Transfer during darkness of casualties from the evacuation control LSTs to designated Attack Transports (APAs) created difficulties which require further solution. LCVPs used for this purpose in many instances had great difficulty in locating the vessel to which directed. Ships designated to receive casualties should display distinctive light groups for this purpose at all times except when danger of air raid or enemy gunfire exists. Transport Squadron Commanders must take positive steps to assure that evacuation control LSTs are kept fully informed regarding the designation of ships allocated for receiving casualties. As a general rule night transfers should be reduced to a minimum. There were a few instances reported of transports refusing to receive casualties from LCVP’s after these craft were given orders by evacuation control officers of LST(H)s to unload their casualties to these ships. Reasons given were that the transports were overtaxed or were not the ships designated as casualty receivers. This condition must not occur. The boats returning from the beach during the early stages of the assault were found to be inadequate for the evacuation of casualties from the LST(H)s to the transports, and it was necessary for the TransRon commanders to detail more boats to each LST(H) for this service. It is recommended that TransDiv commanders maintain close liaison with their assigned LST(H)’s and assign additional LCVPs as circumstances require. USS Ozark (LSV-2), serving as an emergency hospital ship during the night and when transports left the objective, rendered invaluable service, and a greater number could well be used in future operations. Recommend that medical personnel of landing force hospitals and garrison hospitals be temporarily detailed to this type of ship to augment their medical complement until such time as their services are required ashore. 4 Hospital LSTs had been given additional medical personnel, equipment, and supplies to prepare them to receive casualties and act as Evacuation Control Ships. They also had a few structural changes made and carried a pontoon barge for transferring casualties. 1 of the 4 had reefer boxes, a flake ice machine and the personnel assigned to operate the blood bank. It was stocked with whole blood and acted as a floating blood bank until the blood bank was established ashore on D+8. All of these ships, however, brought LVTs to the target and were converted for casualty use after these were unloaded. The design of these ships makes it difficult to care for casualties when empty and after being unloaded they were covered with dirt and grease. the illumination in the tank deck is very poor, and the operating facilities are entirely inadequate. The medical personnel assigned to them was not sufficient to care for the very large number of casualties passing through them in spite of heroic effort on their part. On D-day, from 0900 to 1530 Hours, there had been 1,230 casualties evacuated through these LSTs. This was slightly more than 3 casualties per minute. After a few days and nights of this the medical officers and corpsmen were exhausted. The barges alongside for transferring casualties were usually violently unstable. At times the barges would rise on the swell to the level of the LST deck and on 1 occasion the barges had to be cut loose. However, the transfer of casualties to transports from LVT’s was equally difficult, if not impossible at times, and some means of transferring casualties from LVTs to LCVPs was needed since the LCVPs could be hoisted on the davits to the deck level of the transport and casualties brought aboard this way. LVTs and DUKW amphibious trucks cannot be hoisted in this manner. It is easier to handle casualties in a DUKW than in an LVT Amtrac, apparently due to the ease of handling the DUKW in a seaway. It has more freeboard, steers easier, and is very roomy. 1 LST served 1 beach and evacuated casualties to its transport division or to the hospital ship. With the establishment of hospitals ashore the LST’s were withdrawn and at that time more DUKW’s were available to facilitate the movement of casualties seaward. It is believed that the Evacuation Control LSTs served a very useful purpose, but if they are used for the care of casualties they should not be used for anything else and must be adequately staffed and equipped for this very important job. They must also have several structural alterations to allow for easy passage of the casualties from the tank deck to the operating rooms and should have permanent installations for the care of casualties on the tank deck. Casualties among corpsmen were very high, especially among front line units. In moving about to care for the wounded, they were subject to intense enemy fire and frequently were shot down alongside the man they were caring for. For this operation, each division was assigned approximately 5 percent additional corpsmen before the operation; however, the losses among corpsmen in 1 Marine Division (4th Marine Division) were approximately 38 percent and a little less in the others so that there was need for additional replacements and medical companies were levied on to furnish these. In 1 division this was carried to such an extent that by D-Plus-8-Day, 1 medical company had been reduced to 3 Medical Officers and a few Marines and was completely inoperative as an organization. This is contrary to established doctrine and greatly hinders the care of the wounded. The hospital sections of the medical companies must not be disrupted to furnish replacements for front line units or there will be no 1 to care for the wounded after they are evacuated from the front lines. | |
| Image Filename | wwii1840.jpg |
| Image Size | 697.13 KB |
| Image Dimensions | 2000 x 3000 |
| Photographer | Joe Rosenthal |
| Photographer Title | |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | February 27, 1945 |
| Location | |
| City | |
| State or Province | Iwo Jima |
| Country | Bonins |
| Archive | |
| Record Number | |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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