| A United Kingdom Royal Army Crusader tank operating in the desert near El Alamein in the summer of 1942. The dominant weapon in the desert remained the armored formations. The tank represented the ideal balance of mobility, protection and firepower for the tactical conditions in the desert. Yet if the tank could exploit the possibilities for limitless maneuver that the desert offered, the anti-tank gun and the mine provided the correct antidote to the tank. Unfortunately, the British developed organizational structures which depended far too heavily upon the tank alone and gave insufficient importance to the combination of all-arms. By May 1942, each British armored division was officially composed of 1 armored brigade and 1 infantry brigade. The armored brigade consisted of 3 armored regiments and 1 motor infantry battalion, while the infantry brigade was a standard formation of 3 infantry battalions. This should have corrected the previous overly tank-heavy organization but at Gazala the armored brigades had fought quite independently of their infantry brigades. Brigadier General Tom Corbett (June 2, 1888 – December 30, 1981), Auchinleck’s acting Chief of Staff at General Headquarters Middle East, noted bitterly: “At the Battle of Gazala, Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie’s (July 29, 1897 – December 11, 1983) armor fought without its vital motor infantry component. In one case the Motor Brigade was never nearer than about fifty miles (eighty kilometers) to its armored component, in the other the Motor Brigade was used for static defense.” By the time El Alamein was reached after the retreat, the 1st Armored Division was actually composed of 3 weak and disorganized armored brigades with composite armored regiments. The attached infantry brigades had been lost during the fighting. Thus, throughout the 1st Battle of El Alamein, the British armored forces fought in brigade groups devoid of supporting infantry with the exception of their single motor infantry battalions. Rather than spread the remaining effective tanks thinly amongst 3 weak brigades, Auchinleck decided to concentrate the precious American-built M3 Grant tanks, and when these were used they should always have the maximum available artillery support. The lighter tanks, and the armored cars should be re-grouped to reform a Light Armored Division – the 7th was indicated – to be used on the flank of the main battle. The remaining Grant tanks were distributed to the 2nd and 22nd Armored Brigades. However, there were simply not enough Grant tanks to equip all the armored regiments and this meant that they had to adopt a compromise organization in which each regiment had 1 or 2 “heavy” squadrons equipped with Grants and at least 1 “light” squadron armed with Crusaders. After the 1st days of fighting at 1st El Alamein, the 4th Armored Brigade was taken out of the line to reorganize it as a light armored brigade, thus making use of the large numbers of armored cars and light tanks available. Until Summer 1942, British armored forces had also been outmatched technically by the Afrika Korps tanks. By July 1942, General Claude Auchinleck (June 21, 1884 – March 23, 1981), General Officer in Command Middle East, who had dismissed Ritchie and taken command of 8th Army personally, had recognized that all the current British designs used in the desert were obsolete. In a memorandum concerning the employment of armor he wrote: “We…have two types of armored fighting vehicles. The Grant type which is the fighting equivalent of the German tank and the Crusader and Stuart types which are roughly the equivalent of the Italian tanks in armament and fighting power. The Valentine tank, since it cannot fight the German tank on equal terms, must be regarded as a less mobile member of the second group.” The British had used a multitude of tanks during the desert campaign. However, the fact that 8th Army had, by mid-1942, used 7 different designs of tank not only complicated the maintenance of the armored forces but proved that no 1 design had stood the test of battle. The A13 and A9 cruiser tanks had been replaced by the Cruiser Tank Mk VI (A15), known as the Crusader. The Crusader Mk II was the main British “cruiser” tank in use in 1942, but its performance left much to be desired. This meant that British tank regiments throughout 1941 and into 1942 were solely reliant on a cruiser tank designed for exploitation rather than close fighting, and a tank whose protection could not be properly upgraded. The Crusader looked impressively sleek and was a fast tank with a maximum speed of 27 miles per hour (43 kilometers per hour) but had been designed so hurriedly during 1939-40 that none of the multitude of lessons learned from combat experience could be incorporated into its design. The tank had also been rushed into production which meant that many teething problems remained when it entered service. Reliability remained a problem throughout its service life. Its 49 millimeters (1.92 inches) of front armor compared favorably with German tanks in 1941, but was becoming inadequate by 1942. In the cramped turret the Crusader mounted the inadequate 2-pounder (40 millimeter, 1.57-inch) gun with a coaxial 7.92 millimeter (0.324 caliber) Besa machine gun, which meant that it was seriously outranged by German tanks and had no answer to German antitank guns. It was soon realized that “Cruiser tanks are not suitable for attacking enemy holding positions with anti-tank guns. In such attacks casualties will be disproportionate to the results achieved.” Minute comparisons of differences between the German and British tanks of the early desert campaigns generally miss the most important and fundamental point. While the British initially thought in terms of a tank versus tank encounter, encouraged by pre-war theorists such as Major-General John F. C. “Boney” Fuller (September 1, 1878 – February 10, 1966) and Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart (October 31, 1895 – January 29, 1970), not to mention Major-General Sir Percy C. S. Hobart (June 14, 1885 – February 19, 1957) – who had 1st trained 7th Armored Division before the war – the combats in the desert were a combination of tank versus tank and tank versus anti-tank gun and artillery. The German panzer divisions operated as all-arms groupings which the British found very difficult to counter. The British inability to deal with the German tactics of tank units supported by a mobile anti-tank gun screen, which in turn was supported by infantry and artillery, has generally been ascribed to a cavalry ethos which would countenance no other tactic than the all-out charge. Such views have actually obscured the harder and more unpalatable truth. The real problem was that all the British tanks in service with 8th Army in July 1942, with the exception of a small number of close-support versions which were armed with a 3-inch (75 millimeter) howitzer, primarily designed to fire smoke, were armed with the same 2-pounder anti-tank gun. This meant that, by 1941, British tank crews could only effectively engage German tanks at 500 yards (450 meters) range while German tank crews in Panzerkampfwagen IIIs could engage at ranges up to a 1,000 yards (900 meters). Indeed, the 2-pounder had never really been suitable as a tank-mounted weapon because it was not a dual-purpose gun. The small bore of the gun did not allow the use of an effective high-explosive shell. British tank designers, having absorbed the importance of mobility and firing on the move, mounted the gun so that it was perfectly adapted for firing on the move, but when the tank stopped to fire, the mount remained less steady than a fixed mount designed to be fired at rest. This meant that the vast majority of British tanks, whatever their role, could fire only a solid anti-tank round capable of penetrating German tanks at close range but of no use whatsoever against German infantry or anti-tank-gun positions. This resulted in a real dilemma for British tank crews. Lieutenant Colonel Sir Harold E. “Pete” Pyman, (March 12, 1908 – October 9, 1971), the veteran commander of 3rd Royal Tank Regiment, later explained during Operation Crusader: “At the Battle of Sidi Rezegh (November 23, 1941), I saw a squadron of Crusaders which I had commanded until a week previously destroyed by German anti-tank guns in ten minutes. They were gallantly charging an anti-tank screen. It was the only way in those days. It was very costly and very ineffective.” British tanks which found themselves confronted by German tanks had to attempt to close the range 1st so that they could use their 2-pounder guns effectively. The German tanks would invariably withdraw and pull back onto their waiting screen of anti-tank guns. The British tank crews then had either to retreat – as quickly as possible – or else find some local cover where they could go “hull down” (whereby only their turret was visible) or advance. Simply remaining on the spot was not an option. Unfortunately, no matter what they did, they often failed to spot the anti-tank guns which then proceeded to knock them out. Unfortunately for the British tank crews of the early period of the desert war, the Afrika Korps very quickly perfected the techniques which had 1st come to prominence in the Battle for France. The panzers of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions very rarely operated alone but instead worked in concert with their infantry, anti-tank guns and artillery. British reports noted that: The enemy’s use of his anti-tank guns, pushed right up with or in front of his tanks, was a notable feature of most engagements. They are most inconspicuous and very boldly handled, and he appears to use them for the protection of his tanks in advance, withdrawal and during replenishment. The Afrika Korps was equipped with 2 of the best anti-tank guns of the war. The main 1 was the 50 millimeter (1.96 inch) Panzerabwehrkanone 38 (L/60) which had a very low profile and could knock out most British tanks at 1,000 yards (900 meters) range. However, great use was also made of the famous 88 millimeter (3.46 inch) Flugabwehrkanone 18/36/37/41 dual purpose gun, which could destroy British tanks at 2,000 yards (1,800 meters) range. British reports observed that: “Our tactics have been dictated by the superior range of the German gun, which has made it most expensive for our tanks to be within effective range…Regiments have always endeavored to get hull down positions and to await attack where possible. It has been most expensive to make a head on attack from the front and should never be done except in extreme circumstances, as it was found that the enemy destroyed our tanks before his tanks were within our effective range (800x to 1000x). He was penetrating our tanks at 1,500 yards (1,400 meters). Although British tank crews often believed that their tanks were being knocked out by German tanks, frequently the culprits were well-camouflaged anti-tank guns. Even so, the “charge” against a German anti-tank gun screen was often the only response that seemed possible. If the range could be brought down to 500 yards then the British tanks might – just might – have a chance of suppressing the anti-tank gunners with a spray of machine-gun bullets and a hail of solid shot. Of course, most of the time, this simply led to heavy casualties amongst the British tank crews for little gain. The fact was that British tanks simply had no answer to the German anti-tank guns and their crews. The Grant tank which entered service with the 8th Army in April 1942 was thus more than just another tank with which to harass the Royal Army Ordnance Corps tank workshops. It was a version of the American M3 Medium Tank, armed with a 75 millimeter (3-inch) gun mounted in a sponson on the side of its hull and a 37 millimeter (1.45-inch) gun mounted in a British-designed turret. If a little slow, the Grant was roomy, reliable and well-armored with a maximum of 50 millimeters (2 inches) of armor plate. The combination of stout armor and a much heavier gun meant that, for the 1st time, British tank crews had a weapon that enabled them to outmatch their German opposition. Just as importantly, the 75 millimeter gun could fire an effective high explosive round, which meant that British crews, rather than charging anti-tank guns, could stand off at long range and shell suspected positions in exactly the same manner as the Germans. The main problem with the Grant was that it was a very high-standing tank and, since its main armament was mounted in the hull, it could not take up proper hull down positions. Nonetheless, even though the Grant was clearly a flawed and transitional design, British crews were delighted with it when they 1st received it in May 1942. By September 11, 318 M4 Sherman tanks and a 100 M7 “Priest” 105 millimeter (4.1 inch) self-propelled guns had arrived at Suez. These were the tanks which United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt (January 30, 1882 – April 12, 1945) and United States Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall (December 31, 1888 – October 16, 1959) had promised Churchill on June 21, 1942, after Tobruk fell. The Sherman M4 Medium Tank was better than any German tank in the Afrika Korps with the possible exception of the Panzerkampfwagen IV “Special” F2 which featured a “long” 75 millimeter Kampfwagenkanone 40 main gun. The Sherman was essentially an improved version of the Grant with its main gun in a fully rotating turret. This meant that the Sherman crews could take full advantage of the dual-purpose M3 75 millimeter main gun. The M3 could fire a high-explosive shell and, importantly, also a capped armor-piercing round which could penetrate any existing German tank. The tank shared the mechanical reliability and toughness of the Grant and these characteristics made the Sherman a battle-winner. The same could not quite be said of the Crusader Mk Ill, which, although it mounted the 6-pounder (57 millimeter, 2.24-inch) gun, was not provided with capped ammunition and could not fire an effective high-explosive shell. The small turret was cramped by the large gun breech and the reliability of the tank, just like its predecessors, was still suspect. New Zealand Royal Army General Bernard Freyberg (March 21, 1889 – July 4, 1963) declared that he was “very impressed with the performance of both tanks.” However, the full allocation of “Swallows” (as the British codenamed the Sherman) for 9th Armored Brigade did not arrive until early October. This gave the brigade only a short time to prepare for their role in the offensive that would become the 2nd Battle of El Alamein. The regiments of the brigade had been serving in Iraq and were collected together for training in mid-September, only 6 weeks before the battle. It was later related by the historian of the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry: “Those six weeks were very hectic. They were principally devoted to rehearsing the Brigade’s role in the coming offensive but besides this, there ‘was so much to do and so little time in which to do it.’ A deal of training had to be rounded off as recent events had sadly hampered training. Then the new Sherman tanks were beginning to arrive and these held a thousand mysteries. New machinery, new types of gun, new gadgets galore. All had to be studied and mastered.” On the eve of battle on October 23, 1942, Panzerarmee Afrika was outnumbered in every category – except mines. The British had 170 Grants, 252 Shermans, 216 Crusader IIs, 78 Crusader IIIs, 119 Stuarts and 194 Valentines for a total of 1,029 tanks. Rommel had half that; 299 Italian tanks, 249 German panzers – 31 Panzerkampfwagen IIs, 85 Panzerkampfwagen IIIs, 88 Panzerkampfwagen III “Specials” with the Kampfwagenkanone 38 (L/42), 8 Panzerkampfwagen IVs, 30 Panzerkampfwagen IV “Specials.” But this numerical count was not as simple as it appears. 8th Army had 892 artillery pieces, while Panzerarmee Afrika had 552. This was well below the 3:1 ratio considered necessary by Allied doctrine for successful offensive operations. | |
| Image Filename | wwii0721.jpg |
| Image Size | 2.12 MB |
| Image Dimensions | 5431 x 3376 |
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| Photographer Title | |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | July 1, 1942 |
| Location | |
| City | El Alamein |
| State or Province | Matrouh |
| Country | Egypt |
| Archive | |
| Record Number | |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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