| Stalled and wrecked vehicles of Marines bagged down in soft Volcanic ash on beach of Iwo Jima were targets for Japanese mortarmen who fired down from mountain over-looking beach D-Day. First Aid stations (background) were set up among the debris. Visible in the photos are several Willys MB Jeeps, some modified for carrying stretchers; the shell hit on the LVT-4 amtrac ramp closest to the camera; Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP)s from USS Hinsdale (APA-120) and USS Southampton (AKA-66) swamped while landing or evacuating United States Marines; GMC M3 Half Track with 75 millimeter (3-inch) gun; 2 Marines comforting each other; in the background, a beached Japanese fast transport, its bow blasted off forward of its twin 127 millimeter (5-inch) gun. Japanese fire and the plunging surf continued to make a shambles out of the beachhead. Late in the afternoon, Lieutenant Michael F. Keleher (February 3, 1914 – January 21, 2001), United States Naval Reserve, the battalion surgeon, was ordered ashore to take over the 3rd Battalion, 25th Regiment, 4th Marine Division, aid station from its gravely wounded surgeon. Keleher, a veteran of 3 previous assault landings, was appalled by the carnage on Blue Beach as he approached: “Such a sight on that beach! Wrecked boats,bogged-down jeeps, tractors and tanks; burning vehicles; casualties scattered all over.” Cargo LVT-4 and LVT-2 amtracs of the 10th Amphibian Tract Battalion, not required to penetrate far inland, stopped near the water’s edge to discharge troops on Blue Beaches 3. the Japanese began to recover from the tremendous naval fire they had received and concentrated mortars and artillery on the LVTs and other vehicles attempting to move around on the beach. To add to this increasing litter of damaged vehicles at the water’s edge, many LCVPs, which carried later waves of troops, were stuck with their ramps buried in the loose sand, unable to retract with the rough surf, and broached sideways to the shore. There they remained until salvage could later extricate them, and so they added to a litter that was among the worst seen in amphibious operations. Inland, progress was slow and little room yet existed in the early hours to establish supply dumps on the beach. Marston Matting, hinged steel plates connected together and used for the 1st time to establish quick roads over the sand, had not yet been laid to permit wheeled vehicles to operate. In this situation, the LVT amtrac became the primary means of getting the supplies to the troops. On the initial run into the beach, each cargo LVT carried 700 pounds of high priority cargo to be dumped on the beach and used immediately by the combat troops. It was anticipated that from 1—half to 2/3 of these supplies, consisting mostly of water, ammunition, rations, signal equipment, and medical supplies, would be lost to enemy fire or washed out to sea, but recovery exceeded all expectations because 60 to 70 percent was retrieved and stacked by troops and advanced elements of the shore party landing in the 6th wave. Later runs by the LVTs went directly from supply ships and floating dumps offshore to front line troops, a situation which continued through February 22 in the 5th Marine Division zone, and through February 25 in the 4th Division’s area. Up until these dates, 90 percent of the cargo for these 2 divisions was carried directly from the sea to the troops in cargo LVTs. Even after these days, LVTs were extensively used to move supplies because of poor roads and very rough terrain. This intensive application of the LVT produced rapid mechanical deterioration and after 4 day’s hard service, the number of cargo LVTs shrank from 400 to 267, a definite handicap in the early days of the operation and in part due to the recurrence of an old issue. As in the invasion of the Marshalls, problems were once again experienced with the Landing Ship, Tank (LST) crews that carried the LVTs to the objective area. LSTs were reluctant to draw near the line of departure on D-Day, thus lengthening the run for the LVTs, and later, they refused to service any LVT except those they had carried. Most of the experienced LST crews of previous campaigns had been sent to the Philippines and Iwo Jima had green crews whose indoctrination was not complete. An innovation provided by LST mother ships was a night’s rest in their bunks, hot baths, and food for weary LVT crews forced to work continuously all day and sometimes at night during the early days of the landing. Refueling of the LVTs also became a problem. Bowser boats were too few in number and too hard to find. Medium landing craft, as well as the lighter Bowser boats, were bobbing about too much in the heavy seas to effect safe refueling. The only method that seemed to work was the slow ferrying gasoline drums from attack transports to the LSTs which in turn conducted refueling operations. The strain of this logistics work was lightened to some extent by 3 companies of 6 by 6 amphibious DUKW trucks competently handled by their United States Army crews. Also, a new, small amphibian vehicle was working hard on the scene. This was the M29C Weasel, a small, fully tracked cargo carrier with a very light ground pressure of 1.9 pounds per square inch (13,100 pascals), making it very mobile in the loose sand. It carried its payload of 1,200 pounds smartly about the island considering its tiny 60—5 horsepower engine, could travel 36 mph on land but only 4 mph in water, and was not considered suitable for the open water travels of the larger LST. In surprising contrast to the ferocity of the fight on Iwo Jima, casualties were light among the LVT personnel. Out of around 500 personnel for each battalion, 3rd Amtrac Battalion suffered 8 killed and 17 wounded; 5th Amtrac Battalion suffered 10 killed and 35 wounded; 10th Amtrac Battalion suffered 8 killed and 27 wounded; 11th Amtrac Battalion suffered 2 killed and 34 wounded. Separate figures are not available for the 2nd Armored Amtrac Battalion, but casualty counts appear to be low for this unit also. The explanation for the low casualty figures is in part due to the heavy logistical use of the cargo LVT behind the lines which kept it out of front line action after the early days, and the heavy pre-H-Hour bombardment which stunned the Japanese into silence and allowed the LVTs to land the early waves relatively unmolested. Also, tanks landing early replaced the armored amtracs and lowered their overall exposure to the heaviest fighting. The vehicles used at Iwo Jima differed little from those used at Saipan. The principal vehicle modification was the addition of machine gun shields to protect the operators of the vehicle’s 2 machine guns mounted forward. This was a recommendation forwarded by amtrac personnel as a result of the Saipan landing and incorporated at the factory. The true significance of Iwo Jima in the history of the development of the LVT was its use on an island that did not have a coral reef. The LVT was now more than just a means of landing over a coral reef and represented the desire of the commanders to supply the troops with armor protection and mobility during the critical early phases of the landings. The mobility of the LVT in difficult terrain conditions was never more clearly demonstrated than at Iwo Jima when they managed to move over the black sand with the vitally needed supplies during the 1st 4 days of fighting. | |
| Image Filename | wwii1775.jpg |
| Image Size | 852.09 KB |
| Image Dimensions | 2976 x 2409 |
| Photographer | |
| Photographer Title | United States Navy |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | February 19, 1945 |
| Location | |
| City | |
| State or Province | Iwo Jima |
| Country | Bonins |
| Archive | Naval History and Heritage Command |
| Record Number | 80-G-304851 |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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