| The Soviet Union introduced Kollektivizatsiya (“forced collectivization”) of its agricultural sector between 1928 and 1940 during the ascension of Soviet Dictator and Premier Joseph Stalin (December 18, 1878 – March 5, 1953). It began during and was part of the 1st Bolshevik 5-year plan. The policy aimed to integrate individual landholdings and labour into nominally collectively-controlled and openly or directly state-controlled farms: Kolkhozes (“collective farm”) and Sovkhozes (“state-owned farm”) accordingly. The Soviet leadership confidently expected that the replacement of individual peasant farms by collective ones would immediately increase the food supply for the urban population, the supply of raw materials for the processing industry, and agricultural exports via state-imposed quotas on individuals working on collective farms. Planners regarded collectivization as the solution to the crisis of agricultural distribution (mainly in grain deliveries) that had developed from 1927. This problem became more acute as the Soviet Union pressed ahead with its ambitious industrialization program, meaning that more food would be needed to keep up with urban demand. In October 1929, approximately 7 1/2 percent of the peasant households were in collective farms, and by February 1930, 52.7% had been collectivized. The collectivization era saw several famines, as well as peasant resistance to collectivization. The 2nd Kolkhoz Charter effectively entrenched the collective farm system of agriculture. It was issued as an exemplary or model document in February 1935, replacing the hastily issued version of March 1930 that had become outdated as a result of the subsequent evolution of Kolkhozes. Drafted by the Central Committee’s Agricultural Department, it was distributed to delegates to the 2nd All-Union Congress of Kolkhoz Shock Workers which was held in Moscow. The Congress was attended by 1,433 delegates among whom approximately 1/4 were kolkhoz chairmen and another quarter were brigade leaders. The remainder consisted of rank-and-file collective farmers who had been selected supposedly on the basis of their production achievements. The final version of the charter was produced by an editorial commission of 170 people including Stalin, and the new Commissar of Agriculture, Mikhail Chernov (November 20, 1891 – March 15, 1938), who chaired its sessions. Among the issues debated in the editorial commission and at the congress were the size of garden (“private”) plots for Kolkhoz households, maternity benefits for Kolkhoz women, conditions for admission to and expulsion from kolkhozes, and the right of expropriated kulaks (literally “fist” but “tight-fisted” slang referring to bourgeoisie) to join collective farms. On each of these, the party leadership proved to be more conciliatory towards the bulk of the peasantry than did the shock worker activists. Stalin, for example, reportedly advocated expanding the size of private plots to at least half a hectare (0.2 acre) and granting 2 months of maternity leave at half the average earnings. Thus, as was the case with his “Dizzy with Success” article in Pravda of March 2, 1930, he appeared to distance himself from local activists in the name of accommodating ordinary peasants’ needs. The 2nd Kolkhoz Charter was confirmed by Sovnarkom (CPC; “Council of People’s Commissars”) and thereafter served as a basis for individual Kolkhoz charters which were to be registered by raion (“district”) executive committees. The tasks of determining which Kolkhoz lands would be set aside for private plots, allocating the use of Kolkhoz horses for personal needs, and adjudicating requirements of Kolkhoz membership presented local authorities with formidable challenges. They remained sources of contention within collective farms for many years to come. Thus, ultimately, collectivization represented only a partial victory for the state over the peasantry. It did bring peasants under the administrative control of the state and, through the machine-tractor stations, made them technologically dependent. But peasant resistance extracted certain concessions. In the longer term, a combination of administrative incompetence, under-investment, and peasant alienation led to extremely low levels of productivity and an agricultural sector that, rather than providing resources and capital investment for industrial development, became a net drain on economic growth. Addressing the 2nd All Union Congress of Kolkhozines, Stalin said, “If you want to consolidate the artel, if you want to have a mass kolkhozine movement, which will embrace millions of households and not just odd units and groups, if you want to achieve this objective, you are compelled to take into consideration in the actual conditions, not only the communal interests of the Kolkhozine people, but also their private interests.” “You do not at all take into consideration the private interests of the Kolkhozine people when you say that it is not necessary to give the Kolkhozine more than one-tenth of a hectare as his individual portion of land. Some people think it is not necessary for the Kolkhozine to have a cow, others think it not necessary to have a sow which is capable of breeding. And in general you want to stifle the Kolkhozine. This state of affairs cannot go on. It is incorrect. You are advanced people. I understand that you are very preoccupied with the Kolkhozine system and with the Kolkhozine economy. But are all the Kolkhozines like you? You are therefore a minority in the Kolkhoz.” “The majority think rather differently. Is it necessary to take this into account or not? I think it is necessary to take this into account.” “If in your artel, your products are not yet in abundance and you cannot give to the isolated Kolkhozine family all that it needs, then the Kolkhoz cannot claim to satisfy the social and private needs of the people. It would be better to admit frankly that one aspect of your work is social and the other is private. It would be better to admit squarely, openly and frankly that in the Kolkhozine household, there is inevitably minor but very definite exploitation of the individual. It is not enough to concern yourselves only with the large scale exploitation which is admittedly great, decisive and important and the handling of it is indispensible if the social needs of the people are to be satisfied, but of equal importance with this, if the private needs of the people are to be satisfied, is the handling of the small individual exploitation. If one has a family, children, individual needs and tastes, – with your method these things are not taken into consideration.” “And you have no right not to take into consideration these current interests of the Kolkhozines. Without this, the consolidation of the Kolkhoz is not possible.” “It is the combination of the private interests of the Kolkhozines with their social interests which will lead to consolidation. Here lies the key!” During World War II, Alfred Rosenberg (January 12, 1893 – October 16, 1946), in his capacity as Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete (“Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories”), issued a series of posters announcing the end of the Soviet collective farms in areas of the USSR under German occupation. He also issued an Agrarian Law in February 1942, annulling all Soviet legislation on farming, restoring family farms for those willing to collaborate with the occupiers. But decollectivization conflicted with the wider demands of wartime food production, and Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring (January 12, 1893 – October 15, 1946) demanded that the Kolkhoz be retained, save for a change of name. Führer und Reichskanzler (“Leader and Reich Chancellor”) Adolf Hitler (April 20, 1889 – April 30, 1945) himself denounced the redistribution of land as “stupid.” In the end, the German occupation authorities retained most of the kolkhozes and simply renamed them Obshchinnyye khozyaystva (“community farms”), a throwback to the traditional Russian commune. German propaganda described this as a preparatory step toward the ultimate dissolution of the Kolkhozes into private farms, which would be granted to peasants who had loyally delivered compulsory quotas of farm produce to the Germans.[citation needed] By 1943, the German occupation authorities had converted 30 percent of the kolkhozes into German-sponsored “agricultural cooperatives,” but as yet had made no conversions to private farms. | |
| Image Filename | wwii0562.jpg |
| Image Size | 1.94 MB |
| Image Dimensions | 3440 x 5059 |
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| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | February 15, 1935 |
| Location | |
| City | Moscow |
| State or Province | Moscow |
| Country | Soviet Union |
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| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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