| Original caption: Hideki Tōjō, a former General, Premier, and War Minister from December 2, 1941, to July 1944, appeared for the 1st time in the witness box at the International Tribunal for the Far East, War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan. He is testifying on his own behalf during the defense phase of the trials. Tōjō is surrounded by the Tribunal’s staff. Former Premier and War Minister Imperial Japanese Army General Hideki Tōjō (December 30, 1884 – December 23, 1948), takes the stand before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) for the 1st day of testimony. Tōjō attempted suicide on September 11, 1945, but was resuscitated by United States Army medics. Incarcerated in Sugamo Kōchi-sho (“Detention Center”) after his recovery, he was indicted and arraigned in May 1946. The IMTFE, which ran from April 29, 1946, to November 12, 1948, charged him with several war crimes on April 29, 1946. The 2nd most famous man in Japan to Americans, after Emperor Hirohito (April 29, 1901 – January 7, 1989), Hideki Tōjō represented the top war criminal defendant in the trials led by Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan (January 11, 1888 – December 8, 1954). His trial began in an atmosphere of confusion and accusation. Tōjō was 1 of the “infamous twenty-eight” wartime leaders under indictment. 2 of the 28 would die in captivity before the end of their own trials. Another would be proclaimed “mentally unstable.” Because of his role in planning wartime offensives and his general championing of the militarist agenda, Tōjō faced several damning charges. Shortly before his trial, both the Japanese and the American press headlined that “Tōjō admitted guilt” from his cell in Yokohama’s Sugamo Prison. The world press, which covered the Tōjō trial as page 1 news, referred to Allied interrogation reports of the former premier. Those reports, allegedly leaked to the media by a “high-ranking officer in [United States Army Douglas] MacArthur’s [(January 26, 1880 – April 5, 1964)] headquarters,” were confusing. However, Tōjō could not deny that he had had a senior role in wartime planning. The reports did not note that Tōjō and his counsel, Ichiro Kiyose (July 5, 1884 – June 27, 1967), drew distinctions between the former premier’s “guilt” as a onetime policymaker and his “guilt” as a conspirator and warmonger. Tōjō, the prosecution argued, was part of a 14-year conspiracy to wage aggressive war. Many spectacular atrocities took place during his days in the cabinet or as premier. His public statements at the time on behalf of “Japan’s destiny” were especially damning. And his aloofness, as well as his off-and-on cynical smile, during the presentation of atrocity accounts at the trial itself, suggested to Keenan, at least, that the defendant was truly a cold-blooded killer. Given the press attention to the Tōjō case, leaks were perhaps to be expected; however, Kiyose claimed that the leaks, combined with the general media fascination with Tōjō’s fate, made it impossible for his client to have a fair trial. Kiyose even questioned the adequacy of the translation of the pretrial interrogation reports, insisting that they were “not worth the time and paper.” Maintaining a decent reputation for thoroughness and no-nonsense argument, Kiyose faced a trial in which his client symbolized the “evil of Japan” in the eyes of much of the Allied world. In the face of this pressure, Kiyose approached his difficult task with dogged determination, questioning the very nature of each indictment and the legality of the war crimes effort itself. More concerned with Tōjō as a “criminal personality” and with the spectacular circumstances of the trial, the press and most later chroniclers paid little attention to Kiyose’s efforts. Many considered Tōjō the Hitler who was never tried in Europe. Hitler escaped trial via suicide. Tōjō would not be so lucky. However, in reality, Tōjō was never a Hitler-style dictator; Kiyose’s efforts symbolized a commitment to examining the origins and conduct of World War I, his client’s role in this complex tale of decision-making, and the definition of “crime” in the context of national leadership during times of war. Hence, Kiyose’s contribution to the very basis of the war crimes trials in Japan was quite significant. His search for answers merited greater respect and appreciation than it won at the time or even in the later accounts.” Kiyose even questioned the treatment of his client, suggesting that Japan had surrendered in recognition of the Potsdam Declaration and not under the “unconditional surrender” decision imposed by the Allies on the Axis powers at the Casablanca conference of early 1943. Nazi Germany’s “unconditional surrender” in May 1945 came under Casablanca guidelines, and the Allies could therefore treat their Nazi prisoners “unconditionally,” he said. But given the differing circumstances of Japan’s surrender following 2 atomic bomb attacks, and given the existence of post-Casablanca legal statements, such as Potsdam, Tōjō should not be charged with war crimes, Kiyose argued. Tōjō was interrogated upon incarceration by the Allies; he noted, not knowing that he was not under any formal war criminal charge. Consequently, any interrogation statement, poorly translated or not, could be eliminated from the prosecution’s alleged evidence on those grounds alone. Tōjō’s assigned American counsel, United States Army Major Benjamin B. Blakeney (July 30, 1908 – March 4, 1963), especially echoed this point. Still, as an American, he was remarkably able to hammer away at the matter of America’s own violations of prewar peace treaties, such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Negotiated at the height of the Yamashita case, whereby “criminal responsibility” was accorded to confident wartime leaders for the actions of subordinates. This conclusion went against certain historic “national traditions,” he explained. The Yamashita decision, therefore, had been “arranged” to fit the victor’s agenda in those emotional days so soon after World War II. As a defendant, Tōjō left a particularly favorable impression on the Japanese. During the trial, his eldest daughter, Mitsue Tōjō (1918 – died prematurely of cancer in the 1960s), who, in 1959, would marry Shigeru Sugiyama (April 28, 1902 – January 29, 1982), Chief of Staff of the Japanese Self-Defense Force, was a frequent visitor. Their warm relationship, always so visible to the Japanese press, suggested the loving father more than the mad killer. Through Mitsue, the Japanese learned much about her father, including his concerns over the condition of his bombed-out home, his true love of gardening, whether his youngest sister in Manchuria had survived the war, and his worries over a possible trial or abdication by Hirohito. In saying that he would gladly give his life only to spare the emperor, Tōjō’s respect for Hirohito was evident. Years later, these statements would be remembered above all others that Tōjō uttered during the trial. They helped fuel a legend, 1st championed by Japanese ultranationalists and later by historical critics of the occupation period, that the Allies failed to “get” Hirohito and therefore “settled” for Tōjō. Alongside his pro-Hirohito statements, Tōjō offered tips on how to tend garden vegetables or administer food rationing programs. He even expressed great joy over the early success of the new Japanese yen. Frankly, the Japanese had never seen this human side of their wartime leader before, and a debate soon raged over whether Tōjō might have been “misunderstood.” Another debate argued over intent. Was the new free press more interested in the ex-Premier’s family life than in his alleged crimes? The answer depended upon which newspaper 1 read. Although the final words were spoken in the Tōjō and 24 other senior or Class A war crimes trials during April 1948, it took 7 months for the tribunal to pass its judgment at Tokyo. All were found guilty. Tōjō was sentenced to death. Like Nazi German Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering (January 12, 1893 – October 15, 1946), he preferred suicide to the gallows, but the suicide effort failed, and he was not executed alone. Throughout these trials, the defense counsel complained that fairness remained elusive. The most damaging defense complaint noted that the Office of Defense Counsel had been established for propaganda purposes only and therefore had little practical significance. MacArthur paid close attention to this argument, for it led right to the heart of his reformist mission in Japan. If the Japanese concluded that the trials were, and always had been, a sham, the Occupation Government, he believed, would lose all sense of legitimacy. Tōjō was 1 of 28 Japanese officials tried by the IMTFE. He was convicted of war crimes on November 12, 1948: Count 27: Waging unprovoked war against China Count 29: Waging aggressive war against the United States Count 31: Waging aggressive war against the British Commonwealth Count 32: Waging aggressive war against the Netherlands (Dutch East Indies) Count 33: Waging aggressive war against France (French Indochina) Count 54: Ordering, authorizing, and permitting inhumane treatment of prisoners of war and others (violations of the laws and customs of war) He was sentenced to death, which was carried out on December 23, 1948. Ichiro Kiyose read his opening statement to the court on December 26, 1947: In this opening statement, we shall briefly outline the representations of the defendant Tōjō, as will be testified to by him in his own deposition. The evidence covered is divided into 2 parts, differing in nature, 1 part comprising matters of a general nature which will be amplified and more satisfactorily described by the witness from his own observations as the person most directly concerned. The 2nd portion of the affidavit will consist of internal and external situations in Japan which led up to certain critical decisions and actions as the witness understood them, at the happening, as well as of the expositions of motives, objectives and the esbance thereof, although these decisions and actions of themselves have already been offered in formal proof in the General Division in this case. Tōjō’s deposition begins with July 1940, when he was recommended as War Minister in the 2nd Konoye Cabinet. Before that time, Tōjō had been successively appointed Commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade at Kurume, Commander of the Kwantung District Military Police, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Vice Minister of War, and Inspector-General of the Air Force. But he held these posts merely in a capacity as an Imperial Japanese Army officer, serving faithfully under established military authority, and he was not responsible during those years for the formulation or decision of Japanese national policies. Nor is there proof that Tōjō had taken part in political activity as 1 of the so-called “younger officers” outside his regular duties. Therefore, with regard to the affairs which took place prior to his appointiusnt as War Minister, he has not much to state or refute in particular, hs he once stated to the Prosecution, Tōjō will never evade his political and administrative responsibility for the actions he performed and the events which took place within the ecope of his authority since assuming the post of War Minister in July 1940, and, later, that of Prime Minister in October 1941. As to whether he was criminally responsible, therefore, we must leave it to the judgment of this Honorable Tribunal. Tōjō’s testimony will be given, for the sake of convenience, in the order in which the events took place. So the facts which tend to serve for the same purpose of proof may appear separately from one another in accordance with the time of their occurrence. There will also be some instances where several aspects of the evidence jointly constitute a single fact, which are unavoidable in so comprehensive a presentation of events, and though it is divergent and complicated, the important matters may be summarized into the following 7 points: 1.) That Japan had neither planned nor prepared beforehand for the war against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands. The 2nd Konoye Cabinet, formed in July 1940, adopted the 2 national policies outlined in “Outline of the Basic National Policy” and “Gist of Main Points in Regard to Dealing with the Situation to meet the Change in World Conditions.” It is a fact that these constituted the foundation policies of the 2nd Konoye Cabinet and its successors. They aimed principally at 1) settling the China Affair, which had already broken out, and 2) ensuring the independence and security of the state by strengthening national defense in view of the world situation at that time. The settlement of the China Affair consisted in bringing the issues to an end in such a way as to save the face of both Japan and China, to cease the anti-Japanese movement, to secure friendly relations between the 2 countries for the future, ana to protect both nations against subversive activities of the Comintern, thereby contributing to the maintenance of peace in East Asia, It intended the realization neither of territorial ambition nor the idea of economic monopoly. The Tripartite Alliance was also concluded in order to settle the China Affair and avoid war between Japan and the United States. The actual circumstances relating to these matters at that time will be clarified by Tōjō’s testimony. There was no plan to dominate the world or any part thereof in conspiracy with Germany and Italy. Italy, or with any other nation or person, and his evidence should completely dispel any idea that Japan attempted or carried out such a bizarre affair. It will be shown that both the Japanese Government and the military circles set their hopes on the success of the Japanese American negotiations essayed in April 1941, with high hopes of bringing them to a rich fruition. Proof will also be introduced evidencing the clear intent of the Japanese Government in going to the limits of changing its Minister of Foreign Affairs to make certain of honesty of purpose in United States-Japanese negotiations. Proof will be offered that the Japanese Army formulated no actual preparations for war against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands prior to September 6, 1941. Proof will further be indicated that the war, when it became unavoidable, was neither deliberate nor premeditated. The dispatch of Japanese forces to French Indo-China in 1940 and 1941 was aimed principally at the settlement of the China affair and was carried out under the guarantee of recognizing the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and respecting the sovereignty of France therein. In this connection, we have secured and so are able to produce the letter addressed by Prime Minister Konoye to [French Army] Field Marshal [and Vichy Premier] Henri Philippe Petain [(April 24, 1856 – July 23, 1951)], the then recognized Head of the Republic of France, in July 1941. Further, Japan’s policy towards the Southern regions was limited to French Indo-China and Thailand. With regard to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, it aimed merely at the maintenance of economic and commercial relations. 2.) That hostilities against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands were provoked by the allied nations, and the attacks were unavoidably instituted by Japan in self-defense and for self-existence. It was really a matter of the utmost seriousness that Japan, while involved in the China Affair with its 4 years of exhaustive national effort, should finally decide in 1941 to take up arms against the United States and Great Britain, the 2 greatest powers in the World. How did such a momentous decision reach maturity? Tōjō is able to tell the story. On July 26, 1941, the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands issued orders to freeze Japanese assets. The plan to improve the situation by means of a personal talk with President Roosevelt, which Premier Konoye proposed in August, foiled of effect. Thereupon, the decision to go to war was finally made through the following stages: (a) The Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941. (b) The Imperial Conference of November 5, 1941. (c) The Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941. Of the matters decided upon at the Imperial Conference of November 5, 1941, only Plans A and B, which form but a part of all the matters decided on, have been proved, and the decision itself has not yet been sufficiently shown as a whole (although this is partly touched upon in the testimony of Mister Kumaichi Yamamoto [(April 8, 1889 – January 17, 1963), Deputy Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Minister of Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere]. It will be proved completely by Tōjō’s testimony. At the same time the defendant will, as far as ha remembers, testify to the internal and external situation at the time when decisions were made at the above 3 Imperial Conferences, the information obtained as to the attitude of the United States and Great Britain, procedures that had been taken in advance before the opening of the Conferences, the details of explanations and discussions at these Conferences; and the essential point of the decisions. Of all the items enumerated above, the information obtained as to the attitude of the United States and Great Britain is of the utmost importance. For it will show that the exercise of the right of self-defence was regrettable but an unavoidable course of action which the then leaders of Japan were driven to take. After November, the Supreme Command of Japan was considering that a forestalling attack might perchance be made by the Americans at any time. 3.) That the Japanese Government had scrupulously prepared to deliver the lawful notification of war to the United States of America prior to the commencement of hostilities. In Tōjō’s evidence it will be proved that the to gist of tha note to be dispatched by Japan and the main reasons to be set forth therein were brought up for discussion by Foreign Minister Tōgō, and met with unanimous approval at the Liaison Conference on the December 4, 1941; the procedure of its delivery were left entirely to the Foreign Minister; that Japan would be free to take any action subsequent to the delivery to the United States Government of this note with regular formalities required for notification of war in compliance with international law; that the delivery should by all means be made to the United States Government prior to making an initial attack; and that the time of delivery of the note to the United States Government should be fixed after mutual consultation among the Foreign Minister and the Chiefs of General Staffs of the Army and the Navy. It will also be proved that at the Cabinet meeting on the following day, that is, December 5, Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō [December 10, 1882 – July 23, 1950)] gave explanations of the gist of the note to be dispatched to the United States, which was unanimously approved, and that the formalities to be taken for its delivery were left entirely to the Foreign Minister. It will also be shown how circumspect the Japanese Government was to instruct its Ambassador in Washington in order that this important note be delivered without fail at the appointed time. Namely, it will be conclusively shown that the Japanese Government had never deliberately planned to deliver the note after the Pearl Harbor Attack. That is to say, with regard to the text and delivery of the Japanese final note, both the Liaison Conference and the Cabinet positively believed that these matters had been thoroughly studied and lawfully executed by the Foreign Office authorities in the light of international law and treaties, 4.) The true purport and significance of the Greater East Asia Policy. The Greater East Asia Policy advocated by Japan was known by various names, such as the New Order in East Asia or the establishment of a Co-Prosperity Sphere, etcetera. This term was often distorted and even made an object of vilification by other nations during the war. The Japanese people, however, had always clearly understood the true purport and meaning of the term. The essence of this policy consisted in securing political freedom for all the peoples of Greater East Asia, in accordance with their voluntary desire; in other words, 1st the emancipation of East Asia and then mutual cooperation for the establishment of East Asia. The realization of the policy was primarily to be •affected by peaceful means by appealing for international co-operation and understanding of the various nations of the world. The Pacific War, as stated above, was started for the sake of the self-existence and self-defense of Japan, and not as a means to implement the Greater East Asia Policy. However, once the war was started, it was inevitable that a great change should take place in the status quo of Greater East Asia. We simply took this opportunity to cooperate with the various peoples in achieving their long-cherished desire. In Tōjō’s statement, the substance of the abovementioned Greater East Asiatic Policy, and the measures adopted as an m«ans for its realization will be shown. Above all, it will be explained how: (a) The last remnants of unequal treaties, than existant, between Japan and China, were abolished (b) recognition of the independence of self-government of all East Asiatic peoples. (c) the Greater East Asiatic conference was held to promote mutual understanding between the various nations. These are items connected with and tend to prove that Japan did not entertain any aggressive intention in this connection. (5) The Non-existence of the So-called “Militaristic Clique.” The Indictment opens with the statement: ” In the years hereinafter referred to in this Indictment, the internal and foreign policies of Japan were dominated and directed by a ‘criminal militaristic clique’”. Such an allegation, which seems to be woven through the entire Indictment, is a fallacy of the highest degree, 1 having no basis in fact or foundation whatever. At that time, if it is true, voices of the War Ministry, the Army General Staff, the Navy Ministry, the Navy General Staff, component parts of the state organization, carried great weight. This, however, is attributable to the fact that these military organs had come to be entrusted with greater power as a result of the system of selectii^ ^rmy and Navy Ministers from the active list, as well as the absolute independence of High Command from civil administration< Then too, the political parties became alienated from the people owing to international unrest and internal discontent. It does not mean, however, that there existed any organization having powerful influence which could be termed a “militaristic clique” in fact or in imagination, outside the officially constituted state organization, nor that any such influential clique came to power with the specific object of carrying out policies of their own. Throughout Tōjō’s testimony, it cannot be admitted for a moment that any such imaginary power ever was a motivating force behind the internal and foreign policies of Japan. It is indeed true that there existed a movement by the so-called “younger” element and such incidents as May 15 and February 26 occurred. However, on these respective occasions, the actual leaders of the Army and Navy spared no efforts to suppress them. After the outbreak of these affairs, there were not a few who attempted to achieve their own ambition, taking advantage of these incidents to propagandize that these incidents were representative of the general atmosphere of the Army and the Navy. It happened that these groundless rumors gave rise to a gradual growth of feeling of the existence of some militaristic clique of a tyrannical nature, out We must point out that those who were moved by such rumors did not take pains to ascertain the actual situation, from anyone with responsibility, and rashly concluded out of sheer imagination that there was such a group as to be called a “militaristic clique.” Since the February 26 Incident, in particular, the successive War Ministers had strictly prohibited military personnel from taking part in political affairs, and had been exceedingly vigorous in straightening out and maintaining military discipline. It was widely known that during Tōjō’s tenure of office as War Minister, there was nothing left to be desired in regard to the control over Army and civilian personnel, as well as the maintenance of military discipline. This will all be shown in his testimony. 6.) The independence of the Supreme Command and the functions of the Liaison and the Imperial Conferences. Under the former Constitution, national defense and military operations; that is, matters pertaining to the Supreme Command were not included in the state affairs, as repeatedly alluded to in this trial. Thus, it was generally understood that state administrative ministers (including War and Navy Ministers) were not authorized to interfere in affairs strictly the province of the Supreme Command, In actuality, however, if the state structure was divided into 2 separate parts, the civil adminisstretion and the Supreme Command, having nothing to do with each other, there would be no diplomatic and military functions at work. So in order to bring about adjustment and harmonization between the 2 divisions, the Liaison Conference, the Imperial Conference, and, later, the Supreme War Directing Council were created. It will be explained that matters decided by these organs were further to be ratified, according to the nature of the proceedings, by organs provided for in the Constitution, such as the Cabinet or the Supreme Command, and thus made constitutionally valid, specifying the source of responsibility for the matter involved. The testimony of this witness will be helpful in locating the source of responsibility for various decisions connected with the questions here discussed. 7.) That the dominant characteristics of the Military Administration exercised by Tōjō consisted in a just control and discipline of the military system, and he gave neither orders for, tolerated, nor connived at any inhuman acts. During the periods in which he held various positions in the Army, Tōjō was well known for his stressing of just control and stern discipline. On the occasion of the February 26 Incident in 1936, he promptly arrested in Manchuria many of those involved, and established rigid control to avoid any further disturbances there. When he was for the 1st time entrusted with political responsibility as War Minister in the 2nd Konoye Cabinet, it was 1 of his principles, in regard to the Army, to “further intensify the control of the Army.” Accordingly, in September 1940, when the advance was made into Northern French Indo-China, he ordered a court-martial to determine whether the border was illegally crossed or not. He also requested a court-martial when it was alleged there was maltreatment regarding prisoners of war in connection with the construction of the Burma-Siam railroad. The efficient use of regularity and the observance of laws and regulations were the features of military administration under Tōjō. Careful consideration was paid to the proper treatment of prisoners of war. In regard to the treatment of civilian internees, he never disregarded or connived at violations of laws and regulations. Neither the text of “Prisoners of War’s Labor Regulations” issued in his name, nor the instructions given to the Commanders of the prisoner of war camps ordered forced labor to be imposed. Tōjō issued especially “Instructions to the Officers and Men at the Front” by which he ordered all officers and men to carry out and strictly observe the instructions therein. He never at any time gave orders for, or countenanced the commission of an inhuman [act], and it is a fact, as referred to by other defendants, that he had always been strictly obedient to the desires of the Emperor. It will also be proved that he laid before the Throne the matter of obtaining the Imperial sanction for commutation of death sentences imposed upon enemy fliers who raided Tokyo. This act of his [was] believed to be in accordance with the Emperor’s gracious desires. At this stage of the Tōjō case, no other witness will be called other than Tōjō himself, who will take the stand to give his own testimony. We are to submit several documents, nearly all of which ore either those cited in the Tōjō affidavit or those certifying to non-availability of the original texts of the documents referred to in Tōjō’s statement, in compliance with the regulations of this Tribunal. United States Army Corporal Carl W. Thetford (April 5, 1924 - December 15, 2001) served as a primary photographer of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. He served 14 months in the United States Army Air Force in Italy, and reenlisted in 1946 in the Signal Corps. He often worked with United States Army Signal Corps photographer Louis C. Lemire (January 14, 1926 - May 9, 2015). They share the byline on this photo. | |
| Image Filename | wwii1479.jpg |
| Image Size | 1.37 MB |
| Image Dimensions | 4904 x 3648 |
| Photographer | Carl W. Thetford |
| Photographer Title | United States Army Signal Corps |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | December 26, 1947 |
| Location | |
| City | Tokyo |
| State or Province | Tokyo |
| Country | Japan |
| Archive | National Archives and Records Administration |
| Record Number | NRE-338-FTL(EF)-3161(12) |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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