| High school students impressed into service at the Sanoya Dockyard, Limited, Osaka Navy Works munitions factory, listen to the Gyokuon-hōsō (“Broadcast of the Emperor’s Voice”) when Emperor Hirohito (April 29, 1901 – January 7, 1989) announces the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration to the Japanese people. The Osaka Navy Works was converted to munitions manufacturing in April 1944 and nationalized in May 1945. High school classes were suspended in late 1944, and students mobilized to dig firebreaks, work in factories, and train for the expected invasion. Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK; Japan Broadcasting Corporation) employees were dispatched to the Imperial Palace on the night of August 14, 1945. They recorded Emperor Hirohito’s speech, but recommended that it was too soft-spoken. He offered to record it again, and that was the version broadcast. Die-hard Imperial Japanese Army fanatics, hearing of it, stormed the palace to destroy the record. Loyalists hid it and smuggled it to safety in a lunch bag. The coup plotters committed suicide after assassinating several officers. The Emperor’s broadcast was in classical Japanese, which most civilians did not fully understand, and referenced the Potsdam Declaration, which most did not know about. Hirohito spoke briefly, and his voice was high-pitched; and the quality of the recording also hindered understanding. Hirohito’s remarks, loosely translated: “To our good and loyal subjects,” “After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in our empire today, we have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.” “We have ordered our government to communicate to the governments of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union that our empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.” “To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by our imperial ancestors, and which we lay close to heart. Indeed, we declared war on America and Britain out of our sincere desire to ensure Japan’s self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement.” “But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of our servants of the state, and the devoted service of our 100 million people—the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.” “Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives.” “Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also lead to the total extinction of human civilization.” “Such being the case, how are we to save the millions of our subjects or to atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our imperial ancestors? This is the reason why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.” “We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to our allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the empire towards the emancipation of East Asia. The thought of those officers and men, as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met with untimely death, and all their bereaved families, pains our heart day and night.” “The welfare of the wounded and the war sufferers, and of those who have lost their homes and livelihoods, are the objects of our profound solicitude.” “The hardships and sufferings to which our nation is to be subjected hereafter will certainly be great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, our subjects.” “However, it is according to the dictate of time and fate that we have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable.” “Having safeguarded and maintained the structure of the imperial state, we are always with you, our good and loyal subjects, relying on your sincerity and integrity. Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strife which may create confusion, lead you astray, and cause you to lose the confidence of the world.” “Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith in the imperishability of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy responsibilities, and the long road before it.” “Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude; foster nobility of spirit; and work with resolution so that you may enhance the innate glory of the imperial state and keep pace with the progress of the world.” “Fourteenth day of the Eighth month of the Twentieth year of Showa.” The manufacture of historical memory of the end of the war began in Tokyo at the Imperial conference held in the early morning hours of August 9-10. There, the Emperor, who had belatedly joined the “peace camp” in June by calling for an early though not yet an immediate surrender, and had thereafter vacillated, formally accepted the Potsdam Declaration, in a speech to his ministers scripted for him by Marquess Kōichi Kido (July 18, 1889 – April 6, 1977), Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Shortly before the conference opened, Baron Kantarō Suzuki (January 17, 1868 – April 17, 1948) asked the Emperor for and received special permission for former Prime Minister Baron Kiichirō Hiranuma, President of the Privy Council, a representative of ultraconservative opinion, to attend. Hisatsune Sakomizu (August 5, 1902 – July 25, 1977), Chief Secretary to Prime Minister Suzuki, who knew in advance that the 44-year-old Emperor would give a speech that night, came to the midnight meeting prepared to document it. He wrote up the Emperor’s words in smooth, businesslike language. Many months later, the Emperor himself recounted what was most relevant to understanding the motivation for his seidan (“sacred decision”) at the Supreme War Leadership Council meeting on the night of August 9-10. “At 0220 Hours, with the meeting deadlocked over whether to accept the Potsdam Declaration, Suzuki expressed his wish that I should decide between the two opinions…Although everybody agreed to attach the condition of preserving the kokutai, three — Imperial Japanese Army General Korechika Anami (February 21, 1887 – August 15, 1945), War Minister; Imperial Japanese Navy Admiral Soemu Toyoda (May 22, 1885 – September 22, 1957), Chief of the Navy General Staff; and Imperial Japanese Army GeneralYoshijirō Umezu (January 4, 1882 – January 8, 1949) Chief of the Army General Staff — insisted on adding three further conditions: not to carry out an occupation with the aim of securing specific surrender terms, and to leave disarmament and the punishment of war criminals to us. They also insisted that negotiation on these matters was still possible at the present stage of the war. But four people — Suzuki; Hiranuma; Imperial Japanese Navy Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai (March 2, 1880 -April 20, 1948) Navy Minister; and Shigenori Tōgō (December 10, 1882 – July 23, 1950), Minister of Foreign Affairs — argued against them, saying there was no room to negotiate. I thought by then that it was impossible to continue the war. I had been informed by Umezu, the chief of the Army General Staff, that the defenses of Cape Inubō and the Kujūkuri coastal plain [in Chiba prefecture] were still not ready. Also, according to the Army Minister, the matériel needed to complete arming the divisions that would fight the final battle in the Kantō region could not be delivered until September. How could the capital be defended under such conditions? How was a battle even possible? I saw no way. I told them that I supported the Foreign Ministry’s proposal. Hiranuma’s revision of the Foreign Ministry’s original draft, concerning the phrase ‘the position of the Emperor in the national law,’ was accepted, but later on, that proved to be a mistake. In any case, this meeting decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration based on my decision and arranged to send a telegram to that effect through Switzerland and Sweden…The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we…did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi (literally, ‘children’)]. Second, Kido agreed with me on defending the kokutai (“national polity” – the best possible principles of the Japanese state and society). If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the Imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protecting the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.” Hirohito’s staging of the seidan on the night of August 9-10, his repeat performance of it on the morning of August 14, and finally, the dramatic radio reenactment of the seidan on a national scale, with the whole nation participating, at noon on August 15 — these events reinforced his charisma while preparing a new role for him in the postwar drama that now would begin. After the Hiroshima bombing on August 6, Hirohito procrastinated for a full 2 days before telling Kido, shortly before 1000 Hours on August 9, to “quickly control the situation” because “the Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us.” Kido immediately contacted Prime Minister Suzuki, who began making arrangements for the Imperial Conference scheduled for later that night. Following the seidan of August 10, Chief Secretary Sakomizu took charge of drafting the “Imperial Rescript Ending the War” based on Hirohito’s words. Assisted by 2 scholars of the Chinese classics, Kawada Mizuho (May 24, 1879 – January 1951) and Yasuoka Masahiro (February 13, 1898 – December 13, 1983), Sakomizu labored for over 3 days before submitting a version of the Rescript to the Suzuki cabinet, which modified and approved it after 6 hours of contentious discussion on the night of August 14. Hirohito immediately signed it. Hiroshi Shimomura (May 11, 1875 – December 9, 1957), Minister of State and Director General of the Cabinet Intelligence Bureau, and Kido then persuaded him to record the suitably opaque final version for broadcast to the nation. On the night of August 14, the Suzuki government notified the United States and other Allied governments that it had accepted both the Potsdam Declaration and the United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes’s (May 2, 1882 – April 9, 1972) letter of August 11. Hastening the Emperor’s actions in the climactic moment of the unconditional surrender drama was the American psychological warfare campaign. When a leaflet dropped from B-29s came into Kido’s possession on the night of August 13 or the morning of August 14, he met the Emperor and explained the danger. The latest enemy leaflets were giving the Japanese people both the government’s notification of surrender on 1 condition and the full text of Byrnes’s reply. If this continued, it would undermine the Imperial government’s reliance on secrecy to conceal from the nation the true nature of the lost war and the reasons for the long-delayed surrender. Given Kido’s and the Emperor’s worry about growing signs of defeatism, including criticism of the throne, they had to take immediate action to prevent people from acting on their own initiative. Hence, a 2nd seidan. At noon on August 15, the Japanese people gathered around their radios and heard, for the 1st time, the high-pitched voice of their Emperor announcing: “Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.” There was no explanation of what those provisions were, but his next words went on to concede defeat, albeit indirectly, without ever using the word, and to seize the high moral ground from the Allies by declaring that he was acting to save “human civilization” from “total extinction” by “pav[ing] the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come.” Hirohito also reiterated — just as his War Rescript stated — that the aim of the war had been national “existence and self-defense,” and he expressed regret only to the puppet and collaborationist regimes in Asia that had been Japan’s allies. In an emotionally powerful and astute last paragraph, the Emperor revealed the real goals of his decision to end the war without stating them. He, who had made the war meaningful and valid for the people of Japan, wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, prevent expressions of strife and anger, and strengthen domestic unity centered on himself. “Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the imperial state, we are always with ye, our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity. Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion that can engender needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strife that may create confusion, lead ye astray, and cause ye to lose the confidence of the world. Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishability of its divine land, ever mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and of the long road before it.” Hirohito’s surrender rescript was the 1st text to redefine his new national image as a pacifist, antimilitarist, and completely passive onlooker in the war — none of which he had ever been. It cleverly underscored both his “benevolence” and his assertion of imperial sovereignty while obscuring his earlier reluctance to act concretely, on his own initiative, to end the war. But for those who heard the rescript, it was a shocking experience, a bolt from the blue that caught them totally unprepared. To ensure a correct understanding of the message, which was written in obscure court style, radio announcer Wada Shinken (1912 – 1952) reread the entire rescript in ordinary language. He noted to himself that he was using the same microphone that he used to announce the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, closing the loop on the Pacific War. A cabinet announcement followed, condemning the United States for the use of the atomic bombs in violation of international law and the Soviet Union for declaring war against Japan. Thereupon Wada made these comments: “We ourselves invited a situation in which we had no choice but to lay down our arms. We could not live up to the great benevolence of the Emperor, but he did not even scold us. On the contrary, he said that whatever might happen to himself, “I can no longer bear to see my people die in war.” Before such great benevolence and love, who among us can escape reflecting on his own disloyalty?” Wada ended by reiterating the purpose of the imperial message: “Since the situation has developed this way, the nation will unite and, believing in the indestructibility of the divine land, put all of its energies into rebuilding for the future.” As the special surrender broadcast drew to a close, a news commentary on the Potsdam Declaration again encouraged the audience to accept defeat, display the proper moral attitude, and face reality “with a strong sense of self-reproach…Everyone must bear in mind that if we start blaming one another, it will lead to economic, social, and moral confusion that will destroy the imperial nation.” The Japanese government, having accepted the Potsdam Declaration and the negative moral judgment it had rendered on all of Japan’s modern wars, was thereby obligated to pursue the issue of war criminality. The imperial rescript and accompanying news commentaries of August 14, however, were chiefly concerned with maintaining order while preserving the monarchy and the official ideology. The war in China was not mentioned; aggression was ignored; troops were praised for their loyalty. By diffusing accountability among decision-makers, the notion was planted that “the entire nation should share responsibility.” Osaka Navy Works at Sanoya Dockyard, Limited was dissolved in August 1945. The factory operated as reparations for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers until May 1949. | |
| Image Filename | wwii1585.jpg |
| Image Size | 403.28 KB |
| Image Dimensions | 2048 x 1536 |
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| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | August 15, 1945 |
| Location | |
| City | Osaka |
| State or Province | Osaka |
| Country | Japan |
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| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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