| Seaplane tender USS Tangier (AV-8) embarking United States Marines of the 4th Defense Battalion, at Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, before sailing for Wake in the abortive attempt to relieve that island. Note the mainmast of sunken USS Arizona (BB-39), wrecked on December 7, 1941, barely visible beyond the 1st Marine at the head of the gangway. The tank farm spared by the Japanese on that day is visible in the background. Rifles carried are a mix of 30 caliber (7.62 millimeter) M1 Garands and M1903 Springfields. After a destructive airstrike by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service on December 8 that wiped out 8 of the 12 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats of Marine Fighter Squadron 211 (VMF-211), killed half of its ground personnel, destroyed the Pan American hotel and facilities, and killed 9 employees, the elements of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion under the command of United States Marine Major James P. S. Devereux (February 20, 1903 – August 5, 1988) and the Officer in Charge, Naval Activities, United States Navy Lieutenant Commander Winfield S. Cunningham (February 16, 1900 – March 3, 1986), successfully defended Wake Island from an amphibious invasion by the Imperial Japanese Navy on December 11, 1941. In short order, his gunners sank 1 Japanese destroyer, Hayate. They also hit the cruiser Yubari and several other ships. Imperial Japanese Navy Rear Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka (May 18, 1891 – September 12, 1944) and his subordinates immediately turned and raced out of the American ambush, or so they thought. With only 4 Wildcat fighters left in commission, VMF-211 flew 10 sorties against the fleeing Japanese, harrying its opponents with strafing machine guns and 100-pound (45 kilogram) bombs. A lucky hit from 1 of the latter caused a 2nd destroyer, Kisaragi, to explode and go to the bottom. For an American public reeling from increasingly catastrophic news from Asia and the Pacific, the news from Wake Island electrified a nation reeling from Pearl Harbor and other setbacks. Following the example of newspaper pundits and radio commentators, United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt (January 30, 1882 – April 12, 1945), added his voice to a swelling chorus of triumph, telling millions of his fellow citizens on December 12 that the Wake garrison was “doing a perfectly magnificent job.” But Devereux and Cunningham were desperate. Propaganda claimed they radioed “Send more Jap[anese]!” but in actuality, they sent a long list of needed supplies. At Pearl Harbor, the value of holding Wake, 1 of the cornerstones of prewar plans, looked tenous without the battle line, now sunken along Ford Island, visible from the planners’ windows at Pacific Fleet Headquarters. No provision had been made for defending the island with carriers. More than that, the ships capable of evacuating the garrison were in San Francisco, weeks away. Pacific Fleet planners improvised. If the garrison burned or destroyed their personal gear, all 1,500 contractors and military personnel would fit aboard the seaplane tender USS Tangier (AV-8). William F. “Bull” Halsey Jr. (30 October 1882 – 16 August 1959) But there was little enthusiasm for evacuating the garrison of Marines, sailors, and civilian contractors. United States Navy Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel (February 26, 1882 – May 14, 1968) was in a fighting mood after the destruction of most of his command. By December 10, 3 task forces were directed to reinforce Wake. Task Force 11, under the command of United States Navy Vice Admiral Wilson Brown Junior (27 April 1882 – 2 January 1957), would execute a diversionary raid on Jaluit with USS Lexington (CV-2). Task Force 8 under the command of Vice Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey Junior (30 October 1882 – 16 August 1959) would operate west of Johnston Island to protect Hawaii in USS Enterprise (CV-6). Task Force 14, under the command of Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher (April 29, 1885 – April 25, 1973), would effect the actual relief of Wake Island in USS Saratoga (CV-3). Fletcher had no experience with carriers and was appointed over more senior officers for this mission. USS Saratoga had Marine Fighter Squadron 221 (VMF-221) on board. Later critics of Fletcher’s actions would misunderstand Saratoga’s capabilities. She embarked with only 13 Wildcats. VMF-221 flew 18 Brewster F2A Buffaloes; these temperamental aircraft were difficult to maintain in San Francisco’s well-stocked Naval Air Station. The Marine pilots had no experience with carrier operations. Intended to reinforce Wake’s VMF-211, these Marine pilots knew nothing of combat or that the new Japanese 0 fighter hopelessly outclassed their Buffaloes. Tangier would anchor offshore, and lighters would take in the reinforcements and supplies. If damaged, she would be beached. VMF-221 would fly off Saratoga in their 1st carrier launch and land ashore. Despite the enthusiasm generated by the repulse of the December 8 amphibious landing, the plan was hampered by changes in command. Kimmel was sacked on December 17, but United States Navy Rear Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (February 24, 1885 – February 20, 1966) wouldn’t arrive from the mainland for another week. Vice Admiral William S. Pye (June 9, 1880 – May 4, 1959) took temporary command of the Pacific Fleet for a week that would have historic consequences. Days later, 2 Wildcats were shot down by a sleek new fighter the pilots of VMF-211 had never seen, the Mitsubishi A6M2 0. The garrison had 2 fighters left, and the Zeroes accompanied carrier-borne bombers of the 2nd squadron, consisting of Sōryū and Hiryū. The proximity of 2 carriers, with fighters that vastly outnumbered Wake and Saratoga, was believed to be known to the United States Navy Pacific Fleet Intelligence. But as Captain Charles H. “Soc” McMorris (August 31, 1890 – February 11, 1954), Admiral Kimmel’s war plans officer, put it, “We had no more idea’n a billy goat,” about what Japanese forces lay off Wake. Soon, all the Wildcats were shot down. The aviators and the ground crews were added to the beach defenses. The contractors volunteered to crew machine guns. Fletcher’s postwar critics do not understand the limitations of United States Navy destroyers. Anticipating a combat action, he slowed the task force, which was only making less than 13 knots (15 miles per hour; 24 kilometers per hour) anyway – the top speed of the oiler USS Neches (AO-5) – to 7 knots (8 miles per hour; 13 kilometers per hour) to fuel his destroyers. The weather left his escorts at half to 3/4 full, less than ideal with combat pending. Later wartime classes of destroyers had additional fuel tanks for increased endurance, whereas prewar designs required more frequent refueling. Refueling also delayed the other task forces. When Pye took command, having lost the battle line, Pye was increasingly concerned about preserving the aircraft carriers. Pye had never been in combat and did not want to risk the only offensive assets in the Pacific. December 23, 1941, was the day Task Force 14 would arrive. Fletcher had fully refueled his destroyers and planned to have 2 of them speed ahead with Tangier to land the Marines and pick up the civilians and the wounded. At the same time, the Japanese made a 2nd attempt at landing early in the morning. Heavy fighting broke out. “The issue is in doubt,” Wake Radio famously broadcast. Nevertheless, the Marines, sailors, and civilians had killed a sizable portion of the 800 Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai (“Special Naval Landing Forces”). Cunningham, cut off from communication and realizing that further resistance would be useless, ordered the garrison to surrender. Many Marines, still engaged in combat, were furious. But without relief and resupply, Wake would not hold out for long. As the battle for Wake Island raged, Fletcher’s Task Force 14 was 425 miles (700 kilometers) from Wake, closer than Pye realized. When Pacific Fleet headquarters received the flash that the Japanese had landed, Pye had to weigh the relief of the Wake garrison against the probability that Task Force 14, which comprised no battleships, 1 carrier, and only a few cruisers, might encounter a superior Japanese force. He ordered that the relief of Wake be canceled and Task Forces 25 return to Pearl. Task Force 8 was tasked with covering the withdrawal. Aboard Saratoga, the news was greeted with incredulous anger. Officers begged Fletcher to disobey the order. On USS Tangier, Marines were furious. The services were still small and insular, and many people had friends, perhaps family members, on Wake. President Roosevelt publicly praised the defense of Wake but privately castigated Pye for ordering the withdrawal. He never held a combat command again. The Marines have never forgiven the Navy for abandoning the Wake Island garrison. Since Fletcher was in command at Wake and also at Guadalcanal when the Navy withdrew after the Savo Island disaster, there is particular animosity towards him. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King (November 23, 1878 – June 25, 1956) also disliked Fletcher. After the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, he was banished to Alaska. Fletcher, who was actually a fighting admiral, gets more of the blame, somehow, than Pye in some circles. The failed relief mission remains a topic of hot debate among naval historians. Devereux said in 1970, “I rather doubt that that particular task force, with its size and composition, could have been very effective…I think it was wise…to pull back.” These men were disembarked from USS Tangier on Midway Island December 26, 1941, and participated in the Battle of Midway in June 1942. | |
| Image Filename | wwii1490.jpg |
| Image Size | 1.14 MB |
| Image Dimensions | 5905 x 4392 |
| Photographer | |
| Photographer Title | United States Navy |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | December 15, 1941 |
| Location | Pearl Harbor |
| City | Oahu |
| State or Province | Hawaii |
| Country | United States |
| Archive | Naval History and Heritage Command |
| Record Number | 80-G-266632 |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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