| Original caption: “United States and Japanese delegates to the unsuccessful London Naval Conference of 1934 are, from left: United States Admiral William H. Standley; Tsuneo Matsudaira, Japan’s ambassador to London; Norman Davis, chief of United States delegation; and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. In a reception at 10 Grosvenor Square, London, at the Japanese Embassy, the major delegates to the preliminary discussions for renewing the 1930 London Naval Treaty gathered for photographs. From left to Right: United States Admiral William H. Standley (December 18, 1872 – October 25, 1963), Chief of Naval Operations; Tsuneo Matsudaira (April 17, 1877 – November 14, 1949), Japan’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom; United States Ambassador Norman H. Davis (August 9, 1878 – July 2, 1944), Chairman of the American Delegation to the Armaments Reduction Conference; and Imperial Japanese Navy Rear Admiral Isoroku Yamammoto (April 4, 1884 – April 18, 1943), Delegate to the Armaments Reduction Conference. Tsuneo Matsudaira arrived in London in 1929 and served as Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s for 6 1/2 years. Throughout this difficult time, he made every effort to maintain and preserve good relations between our 2 countries. When the London Conference was convened in 1930 to negotiate the limitation or reduction of warships possessed by Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, Ambassador Matsudaira was appointed a representative in the Japanese delegation, and his presence significantly contributed to the smooth conduct of the negotiations. At the end of September 1934, Standley himself was plunged into the center of the limitation discussions when Roosevelt appointed him naval representative on the United States delegation. His stated reaction was 1 of surprise and reluctance. To a personal friend, he confided, “God knows why they picked on me, and no one knows better than you what few qualifications I have for the job.” On October 23, the preliminary negotiations resumed with the addition of Japan. The inclusion of Japan necessitated a broadening of the discussions that had begun the preceding June in London. The Anglo-American conversations had been conducted on the premise that naval parity between the 2 countries was inviolate. Thus, except for the cruiser issue, the controversy between the 2 governments had involved only qualitative limitations. Japan, however, was not primarily concerned with the size and armament of individual warships, but with achieving parity with Britain and the United States in overall fleet tonnage. This fact was well known to the State Department. On September 7, Naval Attaché Fred Rogers in Tokyo had written the Department that Japan’s policy on naval limitation would include a demand for equality with Britain and the United States, and that to clear the way for a new treaty based upon the principle of parity, Japan would denounce the Washington Treaty before the end of 1934. On October 24, 1934, the United States and Japanese delegations met for the 1st time. Japan’s position was simple and unequivocal. It included demands for naval equality expressed in the form of a “common upper [tonnage] limit” on the war fleets of naval treaty powers and a reduction in the construction of “offensive” naval weapons, especially battleships and aircraft carriers. With no apologies, Japan had hurled down the gauntlet. The long-awaited battle was finally joined. However similar the attitudes of Britain and the United States might have been regarding the merits of a standard upper limit, it soon became evident that the 2 countries could not agree on a method to meet the Japanese challenge. Britain was determined to explore avenues of possible compromise with Japan that would not materially affect its naval superiority. This procedure was inimical to the United States’ belief that the successful management of Japan lay in coercion rather than conciliation. The conflict between these 2 positions began to emerge in a meeting on October 29. While the discussions remained friendly throughout, it was clear to Standley that London believed that the United States “stood in the way of the British getting what they wanted.” Although Admiral Leigh had warned Standley before he departed for London that Craigie was “strong in playing the Japanese against us,” he failed to react to the events of early November as strongly as did Washington. In fact, Standley worked hard to cement Anglo-American relations. Both he and Davis accepted the British contention that an agreement on qualitative limitation was preferable to no agreement at all, and he requested permission to pursue discussions along these lines.43 Hull replied that the “immediate entrance upon new conversations would have a terrible psychological effect and establish a bad precedent.”44 The matter was dropped. From November 22 until the end of the preliminary negotiations, the United States’ position remained static; neither Davis nor Standley would officially discuss a revision of naval limitation while the threat of Japan’s denunciation of the Washington Treaty hung over the conference. On the other hand, Standley’s assurance of support for a qualitative limitation by itself, should the quantitative limitation not be renewed, helped to assuage British resentment against the United States for having refused to discuss any modification of the existing system of restriction. At the same time, Japan threatened to denounce the Washington Treaty. Since Yamamoto did not play golf, informal conversations between him and Standley were primarily restricted to the bridge table. These talks were invariably friendly and usually ranged far afield from naval limitation. They did, however, serve to establish a rapport which in turn led to the most candid disclosure of the Japanese position made to any American. In separate conversations with Chatfield and Yamamoto, which took place at the close of the session, Standley was provided with a detailed summary of the Anglo-Japanese discussions. As Craigie had earlier stated, the British proposed a “face-saving” preamble that would acknowledge the right of all treaty powers to naval equality and an agreement on future construction that would preserve, de facto, the approximate existing ratios. Chatfield and Yamamoto now revealed to Standley that a tentative construction schedule covering the period from 1937 to 1942 had been agreed upon. This agreement would be taken home at the conclusion of the preliminary negotiations for further consideration by the British and Japanese governments. Although Matsudaira and Yamamoto refused to accept responsibility for the proposed Japanese construction, the figures that comprised the agreement were as follows: capital ships — British 6, Japan 2; aircraft carriers — Britain 2, Japan 0; heavy cruisers — Britain 0, Japan 0; light cruisers — Britain 131,000 tons, Japan 60,000 tons; destroyers — Britain 37,500 tons, Japan 60,000 tons; submarines — Britain 17,500 tons, Japan 60,000 tons.51 By Japanese definition, the projected agreement would, in essence, permit Britain an advantage in “offensive” warships and Japan an advantage in “defensive” warships. Although Standley properly refused to predict the course and direction of American naval policy after Japan had denounced the Washington Treaty, he did tell Chatfield that the United States’ construction program for the period in question “very nearly matched the program which he showed me…” At the insistence of the United States, the preliminary negotiations closed in December. The British government’s decision to discuss possible compromises with Japan had placed the United States in a dilemma. Refusal to participate in the discussions cast the United States, rather than Japan, in the role of an obstructionist; yet, unilateral American withdrawal from the negotiations would, in the minds of the public, have settled the question of responsibility for the talks’ failure. Thus, from the end of November on, the State Department worked to persuade Britain, as the host government, to terminate the negotiations at the earliest possible time. Britain, like Japan, desired to continue the talks, but was finally persuaded to agree to termination with the condition that it retained the right to initiate further negotiations through regular diplomatic channels. Based on this compromise, the session ended on December 19. Newsweek reported on January 5, 1935, “December 29, 1934, may prove an important date to be learned by future generations of schoolboys as marking the end of naval limitations. The demise of the Washington Treaty scraps the 5 to 3 ratio for capital ships and aircraft carriers of Britain, the United States, and Japan, as well as the 1.67 scale set for France and Italy. The Condon Treaty of 1930 appears to be destined to expire automatically with the Washington Agreement on December 31, 1936. This document confirmed British and American superiority in cruisers and destroyers but granted Japan parity in submarines. Militarists and big-Navy men, who dominate Japanese politics, have fiercely assailed both pacts for years. General Sadao Araki, former War Minister, and other skillful propagandists demanded vengeance for the ‘national insult’ of low-ratio allotments. Youthful patriots, stirred to fury by newspaper blasts, radio speeches, and sham battles simulating Occidental attacks, found victims at home. In 1930 and 1932, fanatics assassinated Premiers Yuko Hamaguchi and Tsuyoshi Inukai because these statesmen favored a conciliatory foreign policy. Since 1930, as Tokyo’s propagandists and super-patriots gradually gained power, the year 1935 has been called the “crisis year” in Japan. In 1935, a ratio revision was scheduled to be presented at a naval conference, which the 1934 London parley had preliminarily addressed. When ratios were reconsidered, yelled Japanese jingoists, Japan must have equality! Japanese delegates to the London meeting told a similar story. When the parley adjourned in a deadlock 3 weeks ago, the Washington Treaty was virtually doomed— even the calling of the 1935 conference became problematical. There remained for Japan to put the official seal on her act of renunciation. To junk the treaty by 1936, she had to give notice before the end of 1934. She did so just 60 hours before entering her ‘crisis year.’” The discussions that followed in the British capital largely succeeded in achieving Anglo-American unity on naval limitation. In addition to the foregoing concessions by the United States, the 2 sides quickly agreed to support a reduction in the unit tonnage and gun caliber of aircraft carriers and the greatest possible reduction in the fleet tonnage of submarines. Both countries also agreed that questions relating to quantitative limitation should be left in abeyance pending the final determination of the Japanese position. Thus, the only major area of disagreement left unresolved by these talks was that of future heavy cruiser construction. The British desired severe restrictions on heavy cruiser construction, while the United States insisted upon the right to build heavy cruisers in partial compensation for unanticipated large-scale British construction of light cruisers. Despite this disagreement, both sides were pleased by the degree of harmony that was achieved. The limited concessions made by the United States to the British desire for greater economy in shipbuilding were a modest price to pay for Anglo-American solidarity on the paramount issue of quantitative limitation. On December 9, 1935, representatives of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States convened in the Locarno Room of the Foreign Office for the opening session of the London Conference. During the following 6 weeks, the conference struggled unsuccessfully to address the Japanese demand for naval equality. Neither Davis nor Standley played a leading role in these discussions for the simple reason that they did not have to. The British assumed almost total leadership in opposing the standard upper limit. Finally, in early January 1936, the expected impasse occurred. The Japanese delegation sought to pursue a standard upper limit in its resolution; the remaining delegations preferred to discuss a substitute for a quantitative limitation, which would have provided only for advance notification of naval construction. On January 12, the Japanese government sent instructions to its delegation to make 1 final representation on behalf of the standard upper limit. If it was again rejected, the delegation was ordered to leave the conference. 3 days later, that instruction was carried out and, in the face of unanimous opposition to the standard upper limit by the other delegations, the Japanese delegates returned home. Because it had been so long anticipated, the withdrawal of Japan from the London Conference was greeted more by a sense of relief than 1 of despair. This was especially true since it had already been decided that the remaining 4 powers would stay on to negotiate a new pact. With a treaty on quantitative limitation no longer considered practicable, the State Department took the position that the United States was no longer bound to honor the concessions made to Britain the previous summer. | |
| Image Filename | wwii0987.jpg |
| Image Size | 305.64 KB |
| Image Dimensions | 1984 x 1512 |
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| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | October 24, 1934 |
| Location | |
| City | London |
| State or Province | London |
| Country | United Kingdom |
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| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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