| Original caption: “Part of the bomb-blasted waterfront at Tripoli. A wrecked tug lies beside a crater made by an Allied bomb. In the foreground can be seen the submerged hulk of a supply barge.” Original caption: “Axis wreckage around Allied bomb pit in Tripoli; a string of bombs from Allied plane caused the Hole on the sand spit in the center of the picture, and around it, in this waterfront scene of the harbor Tripoli, Libya, are a wrecked Axis truck, left, a foundered tugboat, right, and the sunken hull of a lighter, foreground.” During the 3rd week of January the bombing of Tripoli by the Middle East and Malta-based aircraft was intensified in the hope that it might hinder the enemy’s attempts to block the entrance to the harbor and demolish the port’s facilities. Several Naval operations were staged from Malta for the same purpose. On the night of January 18-19, 1943, 2 chariots – small 2-man mini-submarines – were launched from the submarine HMS Thunderbolt with the object of sinking or damaging potential blockships. 1 chariot succeeded in reaching the harbour entrance, but only in time to hear the scuttling charges in the blockships being blown. The crew became prisoners of war. The other chariot had to be destroyed because of damage to its hydroplanes. Its crew also were captured but later escaped and reached the advancing 8th Army. A 2nd enterprise on the night of 20-21, 1943 was an attack on the mole by Motor Torpedo Boats. During this the Motor Torpedo Boats encountered and torpedoed the Italian submarine Santarosa, which tugs were trying to rescue from a point of land on which she had grounded 5 days earlier. In the next few nights British surface warships, sweeping along the coast, sank numerous small craft attempting to escape to Zuwara, further up west on the coast of Libya, and to Tunisian ports. On January 10, the Naval Base Party destined for Tripoli moved forward from Benghazi to join the 8th Army and, on January 23, the Naval Officer-in-Charge designate, with a small Naval contingent, entered Tripoli 5 hours after the leading troops of the Army. The entrance to the harbor was found to be completely blocked by 6 merchant ships, a sheerlegs (A-frame crane), a rock-crusher and several barges filled with concrete blocks. Demolition on both moles had been thorough and effective and warehouses and installations had been heavily damaged as a result of the Allied air attacks. Numerous wrecks and burnt out ships strewed the harbor but 4 tugs and some 50 lighters were fit for use. That day specially equipped Wellingtons swept the harbor and its approaches and exploded 1 magnetic mine. At dusk, Captain Colin Wauchope (November 10, 1900 – May 26, 1945), the Senior Naval Officer, Inshore Squadron, arrived by air from Benghazi, but unfortunately the Fleet Salvage Officer had to come by sea as few air passages were given because of suspected mining of Castel Benito airfield. Commodore John G. L. Dundas (November 3, 1893 – March 26, 1952), Chief of Staff to Admiral Sir Henry H. Harwood (January 19, 1888 – June 9, 1950), was delayed in his flight from Alexandria by a defective aircraft and did not arrive until early on January 25. The salvage vessel HMSAS Gamtoos, a mine clearing force, and a supply convoy of Landing Craft, Tanks (LCTs), all of which had been waiting at Benghazi, also arrived on January 25. Gamtoos began work next day. The 1st convoy, of 5 merchant ships and a tug, which had left Alexandria on January 21 and had been held at Tobruk awaiting the progress of the 8th Army, arrived at 1400 Hours on January 26 and anchored outside the harbor in an area already cleared of mines. Unloading began at once, using the LCTs as lighters, and 370 tons were discharged. Bad weather held up operations on January 27, only 230 tons being discharged. By January 28, a 30-foot (9 meter) gap with a depth of 9 feet (2.7 meters) had been made in the center of the blockships and 6 of the LCTs entered the harbor and began unloading. On January 30, a 1,000 tons were discharged. Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill (November 30, 1874 – January 24, 1965) with General Harold Alexander (December 10, 1891 – June 16, 1969) visited Tripoli on February 4 and was able to see the 1st 2 large merchant ships enter harbor through a 100-foot (30 meter) gap with a depth of 24 feet (7 meters). Churchill and General Bernard L. Montgomery (November 17, 1887 – 24 March 24, 1976) have both paid tribute in their writings to the speed with which Tripoli was reopened, and the plans for the further advance of the 8th Army do not appear to have been delayed through lack of supplies coming through that port. Nevertheless, on January 26 — 3 days after the 8th Army’s occupation of Tripoli – General Montgomery criticized severely the Navy’s preparations for the task in front of them. Basing, so it would appear, his statement principally upon the impressions of his Chief Engineer, General Montgomery told Commodore Dundas on January 26 that the Navy’s arrangements “for uncorking the harbor were totally inadequate both as regards personnel and equipment.” Next day, in Cairo, Churchill interviewed Admiral Harwood in the presence of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Alan Brooke (July 23, 1883 – June 17, 1963), who had received complaints from Montgomery, and told him of the Army’s dissatisfaction and surprise that an estimate of 14 days had been given for clearing the harbor. Back in London a few days later Brooke, when questioned by 1st Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound (August 29, 1877 – October 21, 1943), informed him that the Army in the Middle East had lost confidence that the Navy would in all circumstances give them the necessary support. As highly satisfactory unloading figures were beginning to reach London from Tripoli, this sorry disturbance of the happy relations between the Royal Army and Navy, which had been sustained through all the wear and tear of the Mediterranean campaigns, might perhaps have subsided without further consequences. Other incidents, however, had caused Churchill to doubt whether Admiral Harwood was suited to his present appointment. On a recent visit to London Lord Richard Casey (August 29, 1890 – June 17, 1976), Minister-Resident for the Middle East in Cairo, had stated his opinion that the Navy’s representation on the Middle East Defense Committee was not so strong as that of the Army and Royal Air Force. In Admiral Harwood’s own opinion much of the Prime Minister’s loss of confidence in him arose from impatience over French Navy Admiral René-Émile Godfroy’s (January 10, 1885 – January 16, 1981) intransigence in joining the Allied cause and Admiral Harwood’s policy in handling the French squadron at Alexandria. The Admiralty decided to relieve Admiral Harwood and to offer him the sea-going appointment of 2nd in Command of the Eastern Fleet. In a letter to Admiral Harwood explaining this decision Admiral Pound wrote, “I am afraid that the arrangements for the clearance of Tripoli harbor are largely responsible for this.” The 1st Sea Lord went on to make clear that the Admiralty considered that the work of HMSAS Gamtoos and the salvage party had been admirable but that not enough supervision had been given on the highest level to ensure that an operation so vital to the Army, and on which everyone’s attention was focused, had behind it all the drive and forethought which it demanded. Admiral Harwood’s health at this time was already beginning to show signs of breaking down, and he had to be relieved even before the date intended. On March 27, Vice Admiral Sir Ralph Leatham, who had been succeeded as Vice Admiral Malta on January 29 by Vice Admiral Sir Stuart Bonham-Carter, took over Commander in Chief Levant, until the arrival of the new Commander in Chief designate, Admiral Sir J. H. D. Cunningham, on June 5. Historians have debated Admiral Pound’s decision to sack Harwood and whether it was just. That the Senior Naval officers in charge were delayed was not adequately communicated to the Royal Army, and they were unable to master the situation. Thus, the Royal Army officers on scene expected the port to be open to traffic on an unreasonable schedule. Montgomery was unjustifiably outraged and his expectations for the 8th Army to be supplied from the sea through Tripoli did not justify going over the head of General Alexander to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Brooke in Cairo. The Royal Navy did not demonstrate the competence and drive needed in a situation of great need. Taken alone, this would not justify sacking Harwood, but with the consideration of the French squadron in North Africa, Tripoli served only to bring to a head the Prime Minister’s and 1st Sea Lord’s earlier doubts whether he was suitable in his appointment. | |
| Image Filename | wwii2040.jpg |
| Image Size | 819.52 KB |
| Image Dimensions | 2932 x 2161 |
| Photographer | |
| Photographer Title | |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | February 6, 1943 |
| Location | |
| City | Tripoli |
| State or Province | Tripolitania |
| Country | Libya |
| Archive | National Archives and Records Administration |
| Record Number | NRE-338-FTL(EF)-2802(2) |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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