| The Royal Navy cruiser HMS Exeter and the Australian cruiser HMAS Hobart under aerial attack by Japanese aircraft in the seas of South East Asia. A Dutch destroyer is visible at right. Most probably, this view was taken as the ship passed through the Gaspar Strait. Royal Netherlands Navy Rear Admiral Karel Doorman’s (April 23, 1889 – February 28, 1942) striking force was the target for repeated fierce attacks by Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft to the east of Banka Island. The force weighed in and left Oosthaven at 1400 Hours on February 14, then formed into 2 columns. The Netherlands cruisers, led by HNLMS De Ruyter, were to starboard, and the British, led by HMS Hobart as Senior “Officer,” to port. The 6 United States Navy destroyers screened the force ahead, and 3 Dutch destroyers were astern. 1 of the 4 Dutch ships had been sent on ahead to mark 2 Brothers Island off the south-east coast of Sumatra, and join later. Air reconnaissance on February 13 had indicated 4 groups of Japanese vessels; 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, and 2 transports about 60 miles (96 kilometers) south of the Anambas Islands, steering south-west at 1000 Hours; 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers and 8 transports some 20 miles (32 kilometers) to the eastward of the 1st group, and steering south at 1030 Hours; 3 cruisers, 5 destroyers and 1 transport, about 60 miles north of Banka Island and steering west at 1530 Hours; and 2 destroyers with 14 transports about a 100 miles (a 160 kilometers) north of Billiton island, and steering south-southwest, at 1630 Hours. Doorman led his force northwards in accordance with the decisions reached by him and Lieutenant Admiral Conrad Helfrich (October 11, 1886 – September 20, 1962) — to go northwards through Gaspar Strait, round Banka, and back through Banka Strait, “destroying any enemy forces seen.” Visibility was poor during the night passage of February 14-15, and at 0520 Hours on the morning of February 15, 1942, HNLMS Van Ghent ran ashore on a reef in Stolze Strait. Dutch destroyer HNLMS Banckert was sent to stand by and take off her crew. At 0600 Hours, De Ruyter flew off her aircraft, which at 0837 Hours reported 7 cruisers and 3 destroyers 10 miles (16 kilometers) northeast of Pulau Laut, some 45 miles (72 kilometers) north of Banka Island, steering northwest at high speed. Interception of this force was not possible if it continued its northerly course and speed. Doorman continued as planned, cleared Gaspar Strait, and steered in a north-westerly curve some 60 miles east of Banka to round the north of the island. Japanese shadowing aircraft were sighted at 0923 Hours on February 15, and thereafter the force was continuously shadowed north of the Gaspar Strait. 2 Japanese formations delivered the 1st bombing attack at 1150 Hours. By 1230 Hours, when it was obvious that the position, course, and composition of the force had been reported, and as conditions were favorable for air attack, Doorman decided, in view of the total absence of Allied air support, to return to Batavia, and through the Gaspar Strait. The course was accordingly reversed at 1242 Hours, when the force was about 40 miles east of the north-east point of Banka Island. Until dusk, the ships were the target for successive heavy air attacks — at 1150 Hours, and, during the afternoon, at 1217; 1229; 1400; 1420; 1441; 1450; 1454; 1459; 1503; 1517; 1713; and 1728 Hours. Ships were near-missed and often completely hidden in the lofty columns of water raised by the exploding bombs, but they were skillfully handled and escaped other than superficial damage. However, USS Barker (DD-213) and USS Bulmer (DD-222) were severely shaken. Hobart estimated that a total of 109 enemy aircraft took part in the attacks, the heaviest of which occurred when 3 formations of 9, 8, and 7 aircraft, respectively, carried out a simultaneous attack on the Australian cruiser. The average size of the enemy bomb was 500 pounds (226 kilograms), though some were heavier. It was of this day’s attacks that Royal Australian Navy Captain Harry L. Howden (July 4, 1896 – February 16, 1969) later wrote: “the bombs fell close enough for me to see the ugly red flash of their burst and to feel the heat of their explosions across my face—but the ship steamed clear.” Commenting that with a less alert engine-room team, the results might have been different, he remarked that “There have been occasions when I have had to call for the most violent maneuvering of the main engines, and the instant answer has resulted in swinging the ship in a manner I hardly thought possible. On one occasion, I found it necessary to go from twenty-four knots ahead to twenty-four knots astern on one engine, while going full ahead on the other.” A reconnaissance aircraft from Chōkai, Vice Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa’s (October 2, 1886 – November 9, 1966) flagship, was sighted by the Doorman’s force at 0923 Hours on February 15. The Japanese admiral received the report about 1000 Hours, “Three enemy cruisers and five destroyers sailing northwards through Gaspar Strait 0938.” The main Japanese convoy from Camranh Bay was then east of the Lingga Archipelago, steering south. Ozawa ordered it to withdraw to the north, and aircraft from Ryūjō, and land attack aircraft of the Genzan Air Unit, to deliver attacks on the Allied force during the day. Not until it was clear that Doorman had withdrawn did Ozawa order the main convoy to resume its southward course. It was the evening of February 16 before it reached the mouth of the Musi River, and the afternoon of February 17 before it reached Palembang. By that time, the advance force had occupied the town. Because of the congestion at Tanjong Priok (where, by February 16, every berth was crowded and at least 30 Allied ships were anchored in the roads), the striking force was split up between Java and Sumatra on its return. “Hobart, Exeter, Tromp, Barker, and Bulmer followed De Ruyter into Tanjong Priok and anchored at 0952 Hours on February 16,” recorded Hobart. That morning, too, the rest of the American destroyers arrived at Ratai Bay to fuel. It was noted, as the force returned south through the Gaspar Strait, that Van Ghent, which had been bombed, was now a fiercely burning wreck. Howden observed that the operation again highlighted the necessity of providing adequate air protection for ships operating within range of enemy aircraft. It also illustrated the disability imposed upon the Doorman by distance. With the Japanese thrusting spearheads a 1,000 miles apart, the Allies lost invaluable time in endeavoring, with the small naval forces at their disposal, to meet and counter each successive thrust as it was made. Inevitably, it meant that they were too late. Doorman’s northward sweep delayed the arrival of the main Japanese convoy at Palembang by 24 hours. Had Doorman been 24 hours earlier, he could have gone north through Banka Strait, and his attack on the leading Japanese convoy and covering forces could have coincided with Allied air attacks thereon, with possibly far-reaching effects on the fate of southern Sumatra. As it was, the advance convoy was beyond his reach on the 15th, and distance alone would have prevented his reaching the main convoy, even without the enemy air attack which, had he persisted in attempting to go north or enter Banka Strait, would most probably have involved him in heavy and fruitless losses. In the circumstances, to withdraw as he did was the only wise course. | |
| Image Filename | wwii1971.jpg |
| Image Size | 202.47 KB |
| Image Dimensions | 1980 x 1280 |
| Photographer | |
| Photographer Title | Royal Australian Navy |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | February 15, 1942 |
| Location | |
| City | |
| State or Province | Gaspar Strait |
| Country | Netherlands East Indies |
| Archive | Australian War Memorial |
| Record Number | P02935.020 |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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