| Original caption: A Coast Guard combat photographer, advancing to the front line in the invasion of Eniwetok Atoll, catches this sharp bit of fighting action. An American plane sweeps overhead to strafe the enemy hidden in their coral trenches, while a group of Marines lie prone in the san peppering the Jap[anese] across smoking No-Man’s Land with rifle fire. 3 United States Marines man a machine gun position near a Japanese dugout on 1 of the islands of Eniwetok Atoll, ready of knock out snipers. A Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bomber is passing overhead. The palm groves have been completely stripped bare by heavy pre-bombardment. Eniwetok Island is shaped like a “war club,” its heavy end resting against Wide Passage, at the southern end, with significant shoals, and, as it turned out, mines — the 1st minefield discovered in the Marshalls. The classified Japanese charts captured at Kwajalein proved invaluable to the Eniwetok operation. The long axis of the island extends from the lagoon entrance northeastward toward neighboring Parry Island. At Y-Hour, 0900 Hours, the United States Army 106th Infantry Regiment commanded by Colonel Russell G. Ayers (September 23, 1892 – May 11, 1952) were to storm Beaches Yellow 1 and Yellow 2 on the lagoon coast at the thicker end of the “club.” On the right, 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Winslow Cornett (February 7, 1900 – June 7, 1959), was to cross to the farther shore, then secure that portion of the island between the beachhead and Wide Passage. Lieutenant Colonel Harold I. Mizony’s (February 8, 1905 – June 28, 1944) 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry, would thrust to the ocean coast and then use 1 company to defend the left flank of the beachhead. The remainder of Mizony’s command was to remain inland of the Yellow Beaches, ready to assist Cornett’s battalion. When the wider portion of the island had been overrun, Cornett faced the task of attacking through Mizony’s blocking position with 1 rifle company and securing the remainder of the objective. The regimental reserve, Major Clair W. Shisler’s (January 17, 1912 – June 14, 1994) 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marine Regiment, was directed to remain afloat off the Yellow Beaches in the event it was needed. The 104th Field Artillery was to land as promptly as possible, move into position, and register to support the Parry landing, an operation tentatively scheduled to begin as soon as Eniwetok Island had come under American control. During phases, I and II, Eniwetok Island was battered by bombs and shells. As early as D-Day, 1 of the Japanese garrison soldiers had admitted that “If such raids keep up, they will intimidate us…” The ordeal continued, but the defenders of Eniwetok were not forced to endure as heavy a weight of high explosives as was showered on nearby Engebi and Parry. None of the battleships turned their guns upon Eniwetok; the cruisers and destroyers fired 1,094 8 inch (203 millimeter) rounds and 4,348 of 5 inch (127 millimeter). These shells struck in an area of approximately a 130 acres. In contrast, Engebi, some 220 acres, had shuddered under 497 16 inch (406 millimeter), 954 14 inch (355 millimeter), 673 8 inch, and 4,641 5 inch projectiles. Parry would receive an even heavier bombardment. Although the pounding which the defenders of Eniwetok Island dreaded so intensely was continued into the morning of D Plus 2, the Japanese garrison, as events would prove, was far from intimidated. The timetable which Tactical Group 1 was striving to follow imposed a special hardship on the 2nd Separate Tank Company, the Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM)s assigned to it, and the USS Ashland (LSD-1) from which the landing craft operated. Because maneuvering USS Ashland in the darkness was believed too dangerous, the LCMs, guided by a submarine chaser, were directed to carry the rearmed and refueled tanks from Engebi to Eniwetok Island. Admiral Harry W. Hill (April 7, 1890 – July 19, 1971) twice postponed Y-Hour to give the armor ample time in which to complete the 25-mile voyage, and the LCMs arrived by 0900 Hours, the time originally fixed for the landings. The bombardment and aerial strikes were executed according to schedule, and at 0909 Hours, Admiral Hill ordered the 2 battalions of the 106th Infantry to cross the line of departure. The soldiers gained the Yellow Beaches at 0916 Hours. Armored amphibians, ordered to move a 100 yards inland, thundered forward a short distance and were halted by a 9 foot (2.7 meter) embankment. The infantrymen scrambled from their Amtrac (LVT)s, some of which had landed out of position, and found themselves confronted by an intricate network of spider webs similar to that which 1st Battalion, 22nd Marines had encountered on Engebi. Mizony’s 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry had the easier going, for by 1030 Hours a part of 1 company had reached the opposite ocean shore. In spite of admonitions from United States Marine General Thomas E. Watson (January 18, 1892 – March 6, 1966) to “push your attack” and “clear beaches,” Colonel Ayers’ troops could make little progress elsewhere in the regimental zone. By noon, the 106th Infantry had won a beachhead that extended from the left flank of Yellow 1 directly across the island, included some 250 yards of the ocean coastline, and then meandered in an irregular fashion toward the right flank of Yellow 2. A stubborn enemy, a series of defenses that emerged undamaged from the preliminary bombardment, plus the inadequate rehearsal and lack of amphibious experience combined to rob the regimental attack of its momentum. The Japanese were quick to seize this opportunity to strike back. The commander of the 808 men of the 1st Battalion, 1st Amphibious Brigade, Eniwetok garrison, Imperial Japanese Army Lieutenant Colonel Masahiro Hashida (???? – February 1944) withdrew about half of his command into the defensive network dug near the southwestern corner of the island and sent the other half creeping through the underbrush toward Cornett’s battalion. Early in the afternoon, 3 to 400 Japanese leaped up and hit 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, on both sides of the trail that ran parallel to the lagoon shoreline. Although the enemy had the twin advantages of surprise and accurate mortar fire, his penetrations of the American line were short-lived. The fighting was bitter and brief; by 1245 Hours the soldiers had beaten off the Japanese. Cornett’s troops, however, reported 63 casualties. Hashida’s thrust had been vigorous enough to convince Colonel Ayers that a single battalion could not overrun the southwestern end of the island. Since he had already ordered Mizony’s battalion to attack instead of remaining on the defensive as planned, the regimental commander had no choice but to commit his reserve. Major Shisler was directed to land 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines during the afternoon, relieve a portion of Cornett’s unit, and assume responsibility for the left half of the island. The Marine unit also was charged with maintaining lateral contact during the attack. At approximately 1515 Hours, the 2 battalions began advancing toward Hashida’s redoubt. As daylight waned, Shisler’s troops collided with a series of log emplacements carefully hidden in the dense underbrush. These positions had survived naval shells and were impervious to damage from mortar rounds. Marine infantrymen and engineers finally killed or at least stunned the defenders with bursts from flamethrowers and with satchel charges. Shisler continued to press the attack, but progress was slow. Across the battalion boundary, which was a line drawn on a map rather than a recognizable terrain feature, 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, plodded onward. Cornett’s troops lagged a short distance behind the Marines, so a gap soon was opened between the units. To the rear, elements of the 104th Artillery were beginning to come ashore. Ayers, having experienced a counterattack earlier in the day, was determined to prevent the Japanese from striking again under cover of darkness. At 1850 Hours the regimental commander informed all battalions that they were to “advance until you have reached the end of island. Call for illumination when necessary.” At dusk, as the artillery was beginning to register from positions to the rear, a few of the 6 light tanks attached to the 106th Infantry that had landed at 1745 Hours, reported for orders at Shisler’s command post. When Shisler, the commander of 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines told the officer in charge of the tanks that the attack was to continue throughout the night, the leader of the armored unit, knowing his vehicles were ineffective in the dark, ordered them to the rear. Since the tanks would be of no help and the illumination of this portion of the battlefield had not yet begun, Shisler ordered his battalion to defend from its present positions. On the right, however, 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry kept plodding along, advancing through an area pockmarked with covered foxholes. At 1945, Cornett reported that his battalion was in contact with Shisler’s Marines, but as the Army unit moved forward, contact once again was broken. By 0333 Hours, Cornett’s command occupied a 3-company perimeter at the tip of the island along the lagoon coast. The commander of 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, indicated that his unit was on line with the adjacent battalion. Actually the Marine flank lay over a 100 yards to the left rear of the Army position. Throughout the night, the Marine battalion fought off sporadic attempts at infiltration. When the skies grew light enough, they looked to their right and were startled to discover that the Army battalion had vanished. The soldiers had executed an order which 1 of Holland Smith’s planners, an Army colonel, later branded as “absurd.” Darkness prevented 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry from mopping up. Thus, Hashida’s remnants were able to enter the gap between battalions and, screened by the underbrush, deliver another blow. 30 to 40 Japanese attacked Shisler’s command post at about 0900 Hours and for a time it looked as though its defenses would be shattered. The enemy struck without warning and pressed his thrust with desperate fury. “In my opinion,” wrote an eyewitness to the fight, “what would have been a complete rout for us was prevented by the initiative and resourcefulness of two men — Sergeant Major John L. Nagazyna (April 12, 1898 – May 26, 1955) and Captain Leighton Clark (January 13, 1903 – February 23, 1944)…who…got many men back on line by threatening, encouraging, cajoling, and dragging them back into position.” Under this kind of leadership, the clerks, radiomen, and other specialists hurled back the Japanese. A detachment of riflemen, which arrived just as the enemy struck, helped stiffen the command post defenses. Marine losses in this furious action were 4 killed and 8 wounded among the command group. Since other units in the immediate vicinity also suffered casualties, the attackers may have killed as many as 10 Americans. Most of Hashida’s troops now were fighting with their backs against Wide Passage. No longer was there any threat of a coordinated counterattack, but the task of locating and killing these last stubborn defenders occupied most of the day. Again, self-propelled 105mm (4.1-inch) guns from the Army regiment proved their worth. By 1445 Hours, Marines and soldiers had overwhelmed this final pocket of resistance, and the southwestern end of the island was secured. While 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry and 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines were fighting their way toward Wide Passage, Mizony’s battalion was advancing toward the opposite end of the island. Like Cornett’s unit, 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry attempted to continue its attack after darkness. The effort was soon frustrated, for “it was impossible to see the camouflaged holes, contact was poor, and the troops as a whole did not seem to have the confidence in themselves that was so apparent during the day.” The soldiers, halted approximately 1/4 of the way to the narrower tip of the island, resumed their offensive after daybreak, and at dark were still short of their final objective. Not until the afternoon of February 21 was this portion of Eniwetok Island overrun. During the fight for Eniwetok Island, the 4th Marine Division Scout Company and the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company continued operations elsewhere in the atoll. Among the islands seized was a coral outcropping just north of Parry, Japtan, which was occupied on February 19. On the next day, the 2nd Separate Pack Howitzer Battalion emplaced its 75 millimeter (3 inch) weapons here to support the attack upon Parry. Jeroru Island (Operation Lilac), between Parry and Japtan, also was occupied, and to the southwest across the lagoon, a party of scouts killed 9 Japanese on Rigili (Operation Posy). By the afternoon of February 21, only Parry remained in Japanese hands. | |
| Image Filename | wwii1676.jpg |
| Image Size | 1.17 MB |
| Image Dimensions | 2924 x 2371 |
| Photographer | |
| Photographer Title | United States Coast Guard |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | February 18, 1944 |
| Location | |
| City | |
| State or Province | Eniwetok |
| Country | Marshalls |
| Archive | National Archives and Records Administration |
| Record Number | NWDNS-26-G-3364 |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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