| Green Beach after the 6th Marines landed by rubber boats. This picture was probably taken was probably taken D-Day plus 1 sometime after 1800 Hours. Taken by USS Chenango (CVE-28) aircraft from an altitude of 200 feet (60 meters). This is the northern section of Green Beach, looking slightly west of due south. Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVPs) lie off the beach, and a few LVT Amtracs at the water’s edge. The large dark concentration, at left center, are some 50 of the Landing Craft Rubber (LCR) – inflatable rubber rafts used with limited success – to land 1st Battalion, 6th Marines on the late afternoon of November 21. At right foreground a line of concrete tetrahedron obstacles slants in towards the shore. This view, looking right across the south-west part of the island to the reef beyond, emphasizes the small size of Betio. When United States Marine Major Michael P. Ryan (January 30, 1916 – January 9, 2005) L Company, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines, informed Headquarters, 2nd Marine Division at 1235 Hours that his force had secured the entire length of Green Beach, USS Maryland (BB-46) replied that the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, would land at 1515 Hours. In the meantime, Ryan was to strengthen his position and continue mopping up. Planning for the advent of 6th Marines on Betio had been going on since 0900 Hours, when United States Marine Major General Julian C. Smith (September 11, 1885 – November 5, 1975), Commanding Officer, 2nd Marine Division, ordered Colonel Maurice G. Holmes (December 14, 1892 – January 20, 1973) and the staff of the 6th Marines to board USS Maryland to confer with the division staff. As the conference progressed, it was decided to land United States Marine Major William K. “Willie” Jones’s (October 23, 1916 – April 15, 1998) 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, by LCR rafts in column of companies on Green Beach. By that afternoon, mechanized landing craft were in short supply – so many LVT Amtracs had been knocked out. Jones’s battalion would reform behind Ryan’s, then attack eastward as far as it could go by nightfall. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray’s (January 30, 1913 – November 11, 2004) 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, would embark behind Jones in LCVPs and Landing Craft Mechanized (LCMs) and would land if needed. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth McLeod’s (October 2, 1911 – June 25, 1944) 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, was to stand by aboard ship, as it was the last rifle battalion that could be made available at Tarawa. Division queried Colonel David M. Shoup (December 30, 1904 – January 13, 1983) at 1022 Hours to ask if he felt there were enough troops ashore to win Betio. Shoup replied that the situation ashore, while improving, was still tenuous. The news was passed to Colonel Holmes, who then left USS Maryland to brief his battalion commanders. Division received a message at 1303 Hours from an unidentified source indicating that a number of Japanese had been seen wading from the eastern tip of Betio to neighboring Bairiki. A message from Shoup within the half-hour confirmed the report. Division contacted Colonel Holmes within minutes of Shoup’s confirmatory message and directed that he send Murray’s 2nd Battalion into Bairiki. That island could not, under any circumstances, be allowed to fall into the hands of large Japanese forces. Besides, an occupation of Bairiki by a strong blocking force would restrict the Betio defenders to Betio. Murray, whose battalion was in boats near its transport along with elements of the 2nd Battalion, 10th Marines, could not respond to the new order by his own radio, so he asked his weapons company commander to query Division for additional details. The officer learned that only organic units were to be landed, not the artillery. After acknowledging the message, Lieutenant Colonel Murray ordered his battalion to start for Bairiki. He and his Marines faced a 2-hour journey, at least. Almost as soon as Murray’s new orders were cut, Division directed McLeod’s 3rd Battalion to take to its boats and prepare to back Jones’s 1st Battalion on Green Beach. At the same time, the M3 Stuart light tanks of B Company, 2nd Tank Battalion, were ordered to land immediately behind Jones to support his assault through Major Ryan’s lines and on down the long axis of the island. As Ryan had warned of obstacles on the southern half of Beach Green, the armor was ordered into what was to be called Green-North Beach. Problems immediately arose. The light tanks were divided between 3 transports — 1 platoon per battalion of the 6th Marines — and all were at the bottoms of the holds to which they had been consigned. Since the 6th Marines had not been committed until the last minute, very little of the gear stored above the tanks had been removed. It would take hours to get at the armor and offload it into LCMs. In the meantime, the transport division commander ordered all available LCMs to secure from all previous missions and stand by; that would at least save some precious time at the back end of the frustrating operation. Colonel Shoup 1st learned that Jones’s 1st Battalion was to be sent to Green-North at 1345. At 1347, Shoup managed to gain direct contact with Jones, whose entire battalion was still aboard the transport USS Feland (APA-11). 1 of Colonel Shoup’s 1st requests was for Jones to bring as many flamethrowers as he could find. At 1420 Hours, Major Jones informed his regimental commander, Colonel Holmes, that his Marines were moving over USS Feland’s sides. There was no way Jones’s battalion was going to be in a position to land by 1500 Hours. Still, since USS Feland was as close to Green-North as was safe, there was some hope that the 1st Battalion, 6th, could be landed by 1530 Hours. Then the biggest snag of the day hit. Senior naval officers, oblivious to the conduct of the battle, decided that USS Feland was too close to the reef, and they ordered her to deeper water. The move forced Jones to secure with less than half his battalion disembarked. When Shoup asked Division at 1525 Hours when he could expect Jones to begin landing, Colonel Holmes broke in to inform his colleague that the 1st Battalion, 6th, might be ashore by 1700 Hours. Shoup was stupified by the news. Aboard landing craft bound for Bairiki, Murray’s Marines were both elated and ill. They were elated because the 2nd Battalion, 6th, was considered a crack battalion, and they were getting a chance to prove their worth. They were sick because the last meal aboard ship had been unusually greasy. In the boat carrying 3rd Platoon, E Company, United States Marine Corporal Carl E. Hanson (June 11, 1922 – January 5, 2009), a Guadalcanal veteran, wondered how his squad was ever going to fight. The combination of the greasy food and the pitch of the boat had left Hanson with a dozen extremely queasy riflemen. Just before Murray’s battalion landed on Bairiki, a flight of Navy fighters and dive bombers worked the island over. 1 tracer round hit some gasoline the Japanese had stored in the center of the island, and the dump blew. Minutes later, at 1655 Hours, Murray’s troops hit the beach. Although the lead wave took a bit of fire just prior to landing, the air strike had apparently cleansed the island. There was barely a shot fired by nervous Marines, and not 1 round in response. The battalion completely scoured Bairiki, but all the 1,000 ready-to-fight Marines could find was a small pillbox housing 15 charred corpses; the small force of defenders had foolishly barricaded itself in the fuel dump. As no other Japanese could be found, Murray’s troops lounged on the beach. At 1706 Hours, Colonel Shoup provided 2nd Marine Division Headquarters with a situation report as of 1600 Hours. After discoursing on the deployment and progress of his troops, the Colonel closed with: “Casualties many; percentage dead not known; combat efficiency: We are winning!” Shoup contacted Division again at 1748 Hours to learn whether Jones had landed. Then he asked Division to tell Major Jones not to advance through Ryan’s battalion until sunrise. Division passed the advice to Colonel Holmes, who relayed it to Major Jones with further news that he was well senior to Major Ryan. Neither Major received the message. Jones’s leading elements arrived at the reef off Green Beach at 1845 Hours, and transferred to 18-man rubber rafts. A Company, in the lead, drew light fire from an unknown source as it furiously paddled through the surf, but no casualties resulted, and the fire ceased within minutes. The only casualties sustained during the entire landing of the 1st Battalion, 6th, resulted from a collision between a supply-laden LVT Amtrac and a Japanese mine. Only 1 crew member survived the blast. Willie Jones found his way to Mike Ryan’s Command Post as soon as he landed and asked Ryan to provide a guide to show him the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines’ lines. Since neither Jones nor Ryan had received the message forbidding Jones’s planned passage of the lines, the 2 coordinated their plans and helped one another deploy their troops to the best advantage to support and undertake the assault. Fortunately, Division got through to Jones within the hour and told him to delay the assault until sunrise. Jones immediately deployed his battalion on a line about 50 yards behind the 3rd Battalion, 2nd, and continued to prepare for the dawn attack, which would be delivered along the south shore. The importance of Willie Jones’s arrival ashore with his battalion completely intact cannot be overstated, nor can the importance of Mike Ryan’s force having secured the beach over which Ryan’s battalion had landed. For the 1st time since the lead LVT Amtracs crossed the reef north of Betio on November 20, the 2nd Marine Division had achieved a decisive lodgement ashore. Jones’s battalion was the 1st of 7 rifle battalions to arrive ashore intact and at full strength. The troops were fresh and, as late arrivals, perhaps a bit more willing than most to prove their worth. It was the only battalion on Betio that night that was neither in direct contact with the Japanese nor at full alert. The battalion staff was able to select a route of attack that would initially bypass strong defensive areas in favor of swiftly advancing through lightly held sectors in order to stitch the separate elements of 2nd Marine Division into a cohesive whole; the bypassed strongpoints would be left to the battalions already ashore. Also, the west-to-east axis of the assault would bring the battalion at right angles to most of the Japanese defensive lines, which would be automatically outflanked. The battalion’s potential for achieving gains was enormous. | |
| Image Filename | wwii1608.jpg |
| Image Size | 248.47 KB |
| Image Dimensions | 1200 x 926 |
| Photographer | |
| Photographer Title | United States Navy |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | November 21, 1943 |
| Location | |
| City | Betio |
| State or Province | Tarawa |
| Country | Gilberts |
| Archive | National Archives and Records Administration |
| Record Number | |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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