| Original caption: “Assault Troops Leaving Alligator as it Hits Beach on Morotai Island.” LVT-2 Amtracs carrying the assault troops of the United States Army 155th and 167th Infantry Regiments, 31st Infantry Division, to Red Beach were on shore at H-Hour, 0830 Hours. There was no opposition to the landings, and the assault troops, once ashore, rapidly re-formed their tactical units and started moving inland or along the shoreline to perform assigned missions. The lack of opposition was indeed fortunate. Had the Japanese been prepared at Morotai, Allied casualties would probably have been extremely heavy. Offshore conditions and, to a lesser extent, beach terrain at Morotai were not at all what had been expected. Available intelligence was not faulty — it was nonexistent. To preserve the element of local tactical surprise, no beach or reef reconnaissance had been attempted at Morotai before September 15, and even aerial photographic missions had been few and far between, lest the Japanese suspect that the Allies were interested in the island. Thus, the landing was planned on the assumption that Red Beach would prove to be 40 to 50 feet (12 to 15 meters) deep and composed of firm sand and that the fringing reef, a 100 to a 135 yards (90 to a 125 meters) wide, would be rough but firm and covered in spots with a light sand deposit. There was some suspicion that these estimates might prove optimistic. In point of fact, offshore conditions at Red Beach were undoubtedly the worst encountered in the Southwest Pacific Area throughout the entire war. The expected light sand deposits proved to be principally a deep mixture of glutinous clay and mud, much of which had only a thin covering of sand. The inshore side of the reef was covered with many loose coral boulders. Finally, the beach itself was much less deep in spots — especially at high tide — than had been anticipated. At Red Beach, all the landing craft waves touched the outer edge of the reef approximately on schedule, and the LVT Amtracs had little difficulty negotiating the reef. Landing Craft, Infantry (LCIs) moving up to the outer edge of the reef at H plus 15 minutes disgorged troops from 3 to 5 feet (1 to 1 1/2 meters) of water. Some of the LCIs stuck on coral heads near the outer edge of the reef, and troops had to disembark in neck-deep water. Several LCIs were unable to retract and had to be towed off the reef later in the day. Landing Craft Tanks (LCTs) did somewhat better, and many of them got to within 40 yards (36 meters) of the beach. But about 75 percent of the engineer vehicles and equipment from the LCTs bogged down in the clay or sand on the reef. Landing Craft Mechanized (LCMs) bringing artillery and engineer weapons, equipment, and vehicles ashore to Red Beach had little better luck, and most LCM cargo had to be towed ashore. Some vehicles drowned out as they awaited towing. It had been intended that the Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) would move into the left flank of Red Beach, but some misunderstanding of orders caused 3 LSTs to come in on the right flank, approximately a 1,000 yards (900 meters) south of the center of the beach. These 3 dropped their ramps about 80 yards (75 meters) offshore and started unloading into 4 1/2 feet (1 and a 3rd meters) of water. As had been the case with the cargo aboard smaller landing craft, many of the vehicles aboard the LSTs quickly got stuck in the clay and mud or were hung up on coral heads. Ultimately, many had to be towed ashore by bulldozers, tractors, or LCTs. 3 more LSTs later tried to beach at the same place. Conditions were so bad that these 3 were moved to positions off the center of Red Beach and unloaded over their ramps into LCTs. At 1130 Hours, 2 additional LSTs scheduled for D Day unloading at Red Beach were diverted to White Beach. The latter was not much better than Red Beach. Clay and mud conditions were not quite as unfavorable as on the reef fronting Red Beach, but the White Beach reef was a 150 yards (a 140 meters) wide, 70 yards (60 meters) more than had been anticipated, and it was much rougher than expected. As a matter of fact, the leader of the 1st LCVP wave had decided, upon approaching the shore, that White Beach would be an impossible landing point. He swung his wave about 300 yards (275 meters) to the north, where, unfortunately, conditions were no better. The rest of the landing waves moved up to the offshore edge of the reef opposite the proper spot. But anywhere in the immediate vicinity of White Beach, movement ashore was difficult. The reef was so rough that at 1 step an infantryman would have little more than the soles of his shoes under water, but at the next he would find himself up to his shoulders. The experience of LCIs at White Beach was similar to that at Red Beach. At the extreme outer edge of the reef, there was a low ridge 1 to 2 feet higher than the rest of the reef. This ridge prevented landing craft such as LCTs and LCMs from landing about a 100 yards offshore. As a result, many vehicles were discharged into about 4 feet of water, most of them to drown out or bog down in mud and clay. Even some “Duck” DUKW amphibious trucks got caught in the mud, while many others became hung up on coral heads. Before 1200 Hours, the reefs in front of both Red and White Beaches were literally dotted with wheeled vehicles of all types, artillery pieces, tractors, bulldozers, and trailers that had bogged down in the mud, dropped into holes, or had caught on coral heads or coral boulders. Some, not recovered for days, were completely submerged at high tide. It was impossible to do a great deal on D-Day to speed up unloading operations. For instance, United States Navy demolition experts were available, but to use them to blast the reefs would have delayed unloading and would not have effected any significant improvement on D-Day. Again, at Red Beach, only 3 of the 8 Shore Party bulldozers launched from LSTs were able to reach the beach. At White Beach, all the Shore Party bulldozers reached shore, but the need to tow other vehicles to shore delayed clearing the beach exits and dispersing supplies on the mainland. By 1445 Hours, conditions on Red Beach were accepted as impossible, and direct unloading of LSTs was practically stopped. 4 LSTs were withdrawn from the reef, but unloading of mobile loads was continued over their ramps into LCTs or LCMs. Then, with the afternoon rise in tide, 3 LCT(6)s and 1 set of pontoon causeways were beached and made into docks. Thereafter, LCTs and LCMs discharged LST cargo across these emergency piers. Even so, the 6 LSTs at Red Beach were only 40 percent unloaded by dark on D-Day; unloading continued throughout the night. The 6 were not completely discharged until D plus 1. | |
| Image Filename | wwii1604.jpg |
| Image Size | 304.11 KB |
| Image Dimensions | 2045 x 1610 |
| Photographer | |
| Photographer Title | United States Navy |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | September 15, 1944 |
| Location | Red Beach |
| City | Gila Peninsula |
| State or Province | Morotai |
| Country | Netherlands East Indies |
| Archive | National Archives and Records Administration |
| Record Number | NWDNS-80-G-257945 |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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