| Original caption: “The look of the vanquished Jap[anese] was caught by a Coast Guard combat photographer in this great picture taken as the Japanese surrender party walked down the ramp of a plane at Manila. the trilogy of expressions range from sorrow – the bowed head of the jap officer at top of the ramp – through stoic pride – the man in the middle – to surliness, as evidenced in the out-thrust lower lip and the scowl on the face of the officer at the right.” Imperial Japanese Navy Commander Yoshimori Terai (1903 – July 20, 1986) leads Imperial Japanese Army Lieutenant Colonel Kiyoshi Minami (???? – ????) and Lieutenant Colonel Morio Takakura (April 13, 1912 – July 25, 1998) as the 2nd group to deplane from United States Air Force (USAAF) Douglas C-54E-1-DO Skymaster serial number 44-9045 at Nichols Field, Manila. The 16-member Japanese delegation to Manila, Headquarters for United States Army General Douglas MacArthur (January 26, 1880 – April 5, 1964), the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), was headed by Imperial Japanese Army Lieutenant General Torashirō Kawabe (September 25, 1890 – June 25, 1960), Deputy Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff. Frequently posted overseas as a military attaché, Kawabe opposed further action in China in 1937 after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which led to the expansion of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War—1 of 7 men allowed by the Americans to negotiate surrender terms in Manila. The other members of the surrender delegation included Imperial Japanese Army Major General Morkikazu Amano (May 10, 1898 – October 8, 1979), Chief of the 1st (Operations) Section of the General Staff—1 of 7 men allowed by the Americans to negotiate surrender terms in Manila. Imperial Japanese Army Lieutenant Colonel Masao Matsuda (???? – ????), Air Force War Ministry Staff; he was instrumental in forming the Kaiko Kai (“Extension Association” – poetic meaning “silkworm” as in “rebirth”) with Imperial Japanese Army Colonel and war criminal Masanobu Tsuji (October 11, 1902 – disappeared c. 1961) and other former military officers. This political organization advocated nationalist policies in postwar Japan, 1 of 7 men allowed by the Americans to negotiate surrender terms in Manila. Imperial Japanese Army Lieutenant Colonel Kiyoshi Minami, Administration and Operations, Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry Staff; he had met with the coup d’etat plotters the day before Emperor Hirohito (April 29, 1901 – January 7, 1989) gave his recorded radio broadcast announcing the cessation of hostilities. The coup failed to find the recording. Civilian Shuichi “George” Mizota (August 25, 1895 – December 31, 1968), Interpreter, Secretary to Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai (March 2, 1880 – April 20, 1948); a graduate of Stanford Law School in 1923, he instantly knew that the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, would be disastrous for Japan. He told a Stanford classmate, “When the shooting starts, I’m going up into the hills and take it easy. And when the militarists want to sue for peace, they’ll send for me, and I’ll have to come down and help clean up the mess.” Forced out of his job at the Navy Ministry for his opinions, he never knew who ensured he would continue to receive his pay. He served as a translator for Imperial Japanese Navy Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (April 4, 1884 – April 18, 1943) until his death and then joined the staff of Navy Minister Yonai. In 1964, he met USAAF Colonel Thomas George Lanphier Jr. (November 27, 1915 – November 26, 1987), who received partial credit for shooting down Yamamoto. Imperial Japanese Navy Captain Toshiichi Omae (1902 – 1978), Chief, General Operations Section, General Staff; 1 of 7 men allowed by the Americans to negotiate surrender terms in Manila. Served with the Southwest Area Fleet in 1943 and the 1st Mobile Fleet in March – November 1944. Civilian Katsuo Okazaki (July 10, 1897 – October 10, 1965), Chief, Research Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 1 of 7 men allowed by the Americans to negotiate surrender terms in Manila. Imperial Japanese Army Lieutenant Sadao “Roy” Otake (1914 – March 25, 1983), Interpreter, 6th Section (Asia Intelligence), 2nd Department, Army General Staff; employed by Domei News Agency before the war, Otake traveled across the United States and Canada, following visiting Japanese sports teams. He worked for Kyoto News Service after World War II and won the Vaughn Award from United Press International for his reporting on the surrender negotiations. Civilian Kazuma Sugita (July 8, 1906 – ????), Secretary to Navy Minister Yonai; he wrote an account of the last 10 days before the surrender in 1976 for the Japan Society of London. Imperial Japanese Army Lieutenant Colonel Morio Takakura, 8th Section (Land and Sea Transport), 2nd Department, War Ministry Staff. A few days after the surrender in Tokyo Bay, Takakura supervised the transfer of the ashes of Subhas Chandra Bose (January 23, 1897 – August 18, 1945) from Imperial General Headquarters to the President of the Tokyo Indian Independence League, Munga Ramamurti (???? – ????) on September 7, 1945. Imperial Japanese Army 2nd Lieutenant Harumi Takeuchi (March 28, 1917 – August 20, 2005), Interpreter, Army General Staff, was a graduate of Amherst College in 1940 and studied at Harvard for a year, but was ordered home in July 1941. He personally evacuated Emperor Hirohito’s portrait from Honolulu before the attack on Pearl Harbor as he returned to Japan. Takeuchi was 1 of the passengers in the Mitsubishi G4M that crashed off the coast of Japan on the way back from Ie Shima and again personally carried the surrender documents to Tokyo. He then launched on a long career in the Foreign Ministry, serving as Ambassador to New Zealand, the Philippines, and Italy. He helped prepare and accompany the Emperor and Empress on a visit to 6 European countries in 1971. Imperial Japanese Navy Commander Yoshimori Terai, Flight Commander of the Surrender Delegation and seconded to the General Staff, had served in the Imperial Japanese Navy for 17 years by 1945. At the start of the Pacific War, he was Naval Air Attaché in Washington. After repatriation on the neutral Swedish steamship Gripsholm, Terai was responsible for allocating resources to train pilots. For the surrender negotiations, he commanded the 2 Mitsubishi G4M “Betty” medium bombers used as transports. After the war, he served in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and commanded the Yokosuka Naval District. His book, Aru Chubei Kaigun Bukan No Kaiso (“Memoirs of a Naval Attaché Stationed in the United States”) was published in Japan in 2013. After serving as a Senior Staff Officer with the 2nd Army from October 10, 1943, until June 19, 1945, Imperial Japanese Army Colonel Arata Yamamoto (1900 – ????) was seconded to the 6th Section (European and American Intelligence), 2nd Department, Army General Staff in August 1945. During the early occupation, as the liaison between the Imperial General Staff and SCAP, Yamamoto communicated with United States Army Colonel Frederick P. Munson (June 19, 1904 – September 3, 1992) regarding the conduct of American officers towards former Japanese military men. Yamamoto, speaking on behalf of his superiors, was shocked by the brusque nature of the Americans and how they treated the Japanese military with contempt. Americans took Japanese swords and cash from the Imperial Japanese Army Headquarters; Yamamoto also demanded guarantees for repatriated Japanese soldiers, who Chinese Nationalists and Communists increasingly brutalized as they returned to power in formerly Japanese-held areas of China. Imperial Japanese Navy Rear Admiral Ichiro Yokoyama (March 1, 1900 – July 28, 1993), Chief of Staff for Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai; 1 of 7 men allowed by the Americans to negotiate surrender terms in Manila. Yokoyama led the “Allies” in a series of war games in 1942 that accurately predicted the course of the Pacific War, resulting in total victory for his team. The results were kept hidden, even from senior naval officers. After a year at sea as Captain of the cruiser Kuma in 1943, he was attached to Navy Minister Yonai’s staff. Imperial Japanese Navy Captain Hidemi Yoshida (March 5, 1902 – April 24, 1978), Chief of the 3rd Section, Naval Technical Council, Naval Relations Division, Naval Affairs, was 1 of 7 men allowed by the Americans to negotiate surrender terms in Manila. In charge of naval demobilization during the early occupation, he remained in service when most officers were discharged. After work, he planned the framework of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and assumed command of the 1st Fleet in 1954. Civilian Morio Yukawa (February 23, 1908 – March 16, 1988), Ministry of Foreign Affairs; a Japanese economist and diplomat, he served as Head of the Economic Affairs Bureau after the war. Later, he served as the Japanese Ambassador to the Philippines and to Belgium. While MacArthur couldn’t have known it, the mere fact that the 2 Mitsubishi G4M “Bettys” bearing the 16-man delegation had made it to Ie Shima without being shot down by their own side was something of a victory as well. At Atsugi, the Imperial Japanese Navy 302nd Kokutai (“Air Group”) under the command of Imperial Japanese Navy Captain Yasuna Kozono (November 1, 1902 – November 5, 1960) was 1 of those isolated bands arguing for continued resistance. Though increasingly debilitated by both malaria and near-constant infusions of sake, the “Father of Japanese Night Fighters” had lost none of his anti-surrender zeal. Indeed, not only did the veteran aviator spur his pilots to continue the fight against the Allies, he took steps intended to prevent Kawabe’s delegation from ever making what he saw as the “treasonous” journey to Manila dictated by MacArthur. Fighters from Atsugi and Oppama, flying alternating patrols over the region, would shoot down any aircraft that lifted off from a Tokyo-area airfield bearing the all-white paint scheme and green crosses mandated in the Allied-mandated livery. Because the members of the delegation were, in Kozono’s view, traitors to both the nation and the emperor, there would be no shame in killing them. Ironically, Kozono’s scheme to prevent the Kawabe delegation from leaving Japanese airspace was discovered and ultimately thwarted by a man who, until just days before, had himself been conspiring with both the 302nd Air Group commander Kozono and Hikōchō Kogure to prevent the nation’s capitulation. Imperial Japanese Navy Captain Mitsuo Fuchida (December 3, 1902 – May 30, 1976) was a living legend in the Imperial Japanese Navy, renowned as the aviator who had led the 1st wave of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and then participated in many of the early key battles of the Pacific War. By August 1945, the 43-year-old Fuchida was the senior aviation officer in the headquarters of the Combined Fleet. When, on August 16, Fuchida was put in charge of arranging the details of the Kawabe delegation’s flight to Manila, he had to confront the 2 men he himself had brought into the conspiracy. Fuchida called the 302nd’s Hikōchō (“Air Officer”) to requisition the unit’s Showa-Nakajima L2D for the delegation’s short hop across Tokyo Bay from Haneda to Kisarazu, and was stunned to learn that Kogure was still refusing to accept reality despite the failure of the coup. The men of the 302nd would continue to engage any Allied aircraft that dared to violate Japanese airspace, the Hikōchō said, and added that an aerial picket line intended to prevent the departure of Kawabe’s delegation was even then being put in place in cooperation with Kozono’s 302nd Kokutai. Realizing that Kogure was likely just following Kozono’s lead, Fuchida decided to go to Atsugi personally to convince his hotheaded friend that further resistance to the emperor’s wishes was dishonorable and that continued attacks on Allied aircraft despite the ceasefire could well result in the dropping of a 3rd atomic bomb. Fortunately, the 1st man Fuchida encountered in the base headquarters building was Lieutenant Commander Toshio Hashizumi, an old acquaintance who also happened to be Kozono’s executive officer. Initially somewhat startled at Fuchida’s sudden appearance, the younger man quickly regained his composure and asked how he might be of service. When Fuchida said that he’d come to speak with Kozono and asked about his state of mind, Hashizumi responded that Kozono was ill, had been drinking heavily, and seemed headed for a mental breakdown. Fuchida immediately saw a way to resolve the crisis at Atsugi without resorting to violence. He 1st secured Hashizumi’s promise of support, then ordered the younger man to summon an ambulance. That done, the 2 officers waited until the ambulance arrived and then walked to the door of Kozono’s quarters. Pausing for a moment to steel themselves, the men then burst into the room, seized Kozono, and wrestled him to the floor before he could draw his sword. Though bellowing like an enraged bull, the 302nd commander could not free himself, and at Fuchida’s command, the ambulance orderlies stormed in, quickly buckled the “Father of Japanese Night Fighters” into a straitjacket, and then rushed him to the ambulance for the drive to the mental ward at Yokosuka Naval Hospital. In 1 stroke, Fuchida had eliminated possibly the greatest obstacle to Japan’s surrender, without drawing a single drop of blood. MacArthur’s gamble had paid off. The arrival of the Kawabe delegation in Manila was a sure indication that Japan would indeed surrender. Attacks on American aircraft over Japan were isolated incidents and not organized national resistance. Just after 0600 Hours on August 19, a 16-member delegation led by Lieutenant General Kawabe boarded a Showa-Nakajima L2D Allied code name “Tabby” twin-engine transport (license-built Douglas DC-3) at Haneda airport on the west side of Tokyo Bay. 14 minutes later, the aircraft landed at the navy airfield at Kisarazu, just across the bay in Chiba Prefecture. There, the Manila-bound delegates were split into 10-man groups, each then clambering aboard an Imperial Japanese Navy Mitsubishi G4M, Allied code-named “Betty, ” twin-engine bomber. The 2 machines — a G6M1-L2 transport variant (call sign “Bataan 1”) and a demilitarized G4M1 bomber (call sign “Bataan 2”) — were both painted white and bore the green wing, tail, and fuselage crosses stipulated in MacArthur’s directive. The planes lifted off from Kisarazu at 0707 Hours and flew southwest, skirting the southern coasts of Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu. Just after 1100 Hours, the L2D “Tabby” from the 302nd Kokutai passed over Cape Sata, Misaki — the southernmost point on Kyushu, which had been designated initially as their take-off point — and were joined by their United States Army Air Force (USAAF) escort, 2 B-25J Mitchells of the 345th Bomb Group and a gaggle of P-38 Lightnings of the 49th Fighter Group. The onward flight to Ie Shima was uneventful, and the 1st Betty landed at 1240 Hours at Birch Airfield, marked with a white cross so the Americans wold hold their fire. After a short time on the ground, the 16 delegates boarded an Army Air Forces C-45E 4-engine transport for the onward flight to Manila. The Mitsubishi G4M “Betty” medium bombers remained at Ie Shima for their return. At 1755 Hours on August 19, the C-54 reached Nichols Field on Luzon. A massive press gaggle awaited their arrival, coming from all over the world. Coast Guard Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class James T. Seright (March 17, 1920 – December 21, 1971) of Ottawa, Kansas, was 1 of the correspondents, and he took this view as the Japanese delegation exited 44-9045. 2 conferences were held during the 19 hours that the Japanese mission remained in Manila, with Kawabe and his colleagues cooperating fully to provide information on harbors and airfields around Tokyo that the Allied forces would require for their entry. Only 7 of the officers, with 2 interpreters, were allowed to participate. The rest were given quarters and Army rations for lunch. The Japanese envoys further reported that there were 8 Japanese submarines at sea — 3 near Okinawa, 3 in the vicinity of the Marianas, and 2 near Truk. On August 16 and again on August 18, these submarines had been ordered to cease hostilities and return to base. As soon as the Japanese delegation had completed this briefing of their recent enemies, they were handed a copy of the Instrument of Surrender, which representatives of the Japanese Government would have to sign at the formal surrender ceremonies. It was emphasized at this time that, despite a popular misconception of their role, the enemy emissaries at Manila were not empowered to bargain, but merely to accept and transmit the occupation terms to Japanese Imperial Headquarters. If, however, Japan should reject these terms, her only alternative would be to resume fighting. As early as May 1945, members of MacArthur’s staff began formulating Operation Blacklist, a contingency plan to be put into effect should Japan suddenly collapse and surrender before the Allies could launch their planned 2-phase invasion — Operations Olympic and Coronet. Blacklist’s primary goals were almost identical to those of the intended armed invasion, and included the “early introduction of occupying forces into major strategic areas; the control of critical ports, port facilities and airfields; and the demobilization and disarmament of enemy troops.” More to the point, Blacklist would use all the American forces available in the Pacific Theater at the time of its execution; just in terms of ground troops, this would amount to some 22 divisions and 2 regimental combat teams totaling more than 700,000 men. Japan proper was to be the priority, followed by Korea, then Formosa, and the Japanese-controlled parts of China. As Supreme Commander Allied Powers, MacArthur would have the final authority to designate the place and time of the actual surrender ceremony, as well as to set the date for the beginning of the occupation. Blacklist had been presented to, and approved by, the various Pacific Theater service commanders at a July 1945 conference on Guam. The details of Blacklist were communicated to the Japanese during the 1st night’s session of the August 19-20 conference in Manila between Kawabe’s delegation and MacArthur’s team, headed by his Chief of Staff, United States Army Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland (November 27, 1893 – June 25, 1966). The Japanese were told that a small Allied advance unit would land at Atsugi on August 23, and would be followed 2 days later by the lead elements of the larger formations tapped for occupation duty. Kawabe was horrified by the thought that the largest Kamikaze (Shimpu – “Special Attack”) training airfield in Japan was to be the 1st place Allied troops would set foot. However, when he told the Americans that the air station had been in open revolt and was likely still a center of anti-surrender fervor, he was merely given extra time to “get the situation under control.” The arrival of the advance unit at Atsugi was therefore rescheduled for August 26, with the large-scale landings to commence on August 28. | |
| Image Filename | wwii1570.jpg |
| Image Size | 1.09 MB |
| Image Dimensions | 2896 x 2361 |
| Photographer | James T. Seright |
| Photographer Title | United States Coast Guard |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | August 19, 1945 |
| Location | Nichols Field |
| City | Pasay |
| State or Province | Luzon |
| Country | Philippines |
| Archive | National Archives and Records Administration |
| Record Number | NWDNS-26-G-4774 |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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