| Original caption: “Imprisoned – Former Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was sentenced today to eighteen years in prison for atrocities against Poles and Russians committed by German troops during the war. A German military court pronounced sentence. He is the last of Hitler’s generals to be tried by the Allies.” Generalfeldmarschall Fritz Erich von Manstein, born Fritz Erich von Lewinski (November 24, 1887 – June 9, 1973), Kommandant 11.Armee, in the defendant’s box at his trial. Manstein, a witness at the main International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1945, was instrumental in absolving the German High Command from war crimes charges at the October 1946 verdict. Manstein’s trial took place before a British military tribunal in Hamburg, in the Curio House, beginning on August 23, 1949. The walls of the courtroom were covered with maps illustrating where Manstein’s armies were located at each point in the war in the East. In the hallways, it was recounted that, if Manstein had surrendered to the Polish, he would have been hanged, whereas if he had handed himself over to the Russians, he would have been placed at the head of an army group, while the British were having difficulties choosing which of the options they liked the least. The decision to prosecute Manstein for war crimes was made by the British Cabinet, following a long period of vacillation. The Nuremberg judgement relating to the German General Staff had included a key recommendation: Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to trial so that those among them who are guilty of these crimes should not escape punishment. Acting on this remit, United States investigators, led by United States Army Colonel Telford Taylor (February 24, 1908 – May 23, 1998), compiled an extensive 82-page dossier of evidence on the senior German officers held in British custody. Passed to the British Attorney General in August 1947, it exposed apparently strong evidence from German operations on the Eastern Front that appeared to incriminate Manstein heavily, as well as Rundstedt, Brauchitsch, and Strauss. In contrast, senior officers within the British Army of the Rhine and the British Military Government in Germany were firmly opposed to any trials in the face of Soviet hostility and the need to garner West German support against any potential aggression. This view reflected an assessment of the German domestic situation at a time when the Soviet government was holding out promises of a unified, neutral state. Hence, the demands of geopolitics, as much as the requirements of justice, drove decision-making over those suspected of war crimes. On March 2, 1949, a joint board of 2 experienced medical officers of the British prison service and 2 army doctors examined the 3 surviving senior officers held in Hamburg. Finding Manstein “alert and co-operative” and “well” apart from “his longstanding eye condition,” they concluded that “he is fit to stand trial; and that he will remain fit to instruct his Defence Counsel during such a trial, also to give evidence if he wishes, be cross-examined and follow proceedings in court. We do not consider that there is any serious probability that he will collapse or break down under the strain of the trial. The court was held in the main concert hall of Hamburg’s Curio House from August 23 to December 19, 1949. A plaque on an external wall today recalls that the building was used in 1946-1948 by a British military court for conducting trials against members of the Schutzstaffel SS who were responsible for crimes in the Neuengamme concentration camp. There is no reminder of the Manstein trial, presumably to prevent the Curio House from becoming a shrine for German militarism. During the 62 days of proceedings, the courtroom was open to members of the press and public, except for 2 days when sessions were held in camera. His defense counsel, Reginald Paget, Baron Paget of Northampton (September 2, 1908 – January 2, 1990), recalled that Manstein was an “erect and dignified figure” in the dock, adding that “the doddering almost blind old Field Marshal was as much a figment of the journalistic imagination as the jackbooted spectators.” In the German gallery, looking down into the hall sat his wife, “an inconspicuous little woman in dark, severe clothes.” The Manchester Guardian described the government’s announcement to try Manstein for war crimes as an “inglorious decision.” Its editorial continued in the following terms: “Heaven is weary of the hollow words, which States and Kingdoms utter, when they talk of truth and justice.” For the news weekly The Economist, the trying “of one of the most gifted German commanders of the war in Russia and in Poland would be rather incompatible with winning Germany over to the cause of the West in the Cold War […]. The result of the delay […] was most likely due to the reluctance for a trial of such importance for which all of the evidence originated from the other side of the Iron Curtain.” Significantly, amongst the 17 charges raised against Manstein at his war crimes trial in 1949, 1 involved the implementation of the Commissar Order within his command. In order to impede the enemy’s advance and thereby facilitate the German withdrawal, Manstein applied Hitler’s policy of “scorched earth,” 1 which he noted “the Soviets had adopted during their retreats in the previous year.” That argument, however, yielded little legitimacy during his war crimes trial 6 years later in Hamburg. As an occupying power, Germany was required to protect the local population. Unsurprisingly, Manstein was at pains to stress that “all the measures on the German side were conditioned by military necessity.” Barely a few days after taking command of 11th Army, Manstein, still a general at the time, was informed of the execution of Jews in the military zone falling under his authority. On September 12, 1941, Einsatgruppe D submitted a report to the high command of the 11th Army concerning the activities of Sonderkommando 11a in Kherson from August 22 to September 10. It was received on September 14, 3 days before Manstein assumed command. On September 26, it was presented to Manstein, and he signed it. The report, which represented 1 of the charges filed against Manstein during his trial, described the situation in the following terms: “The Jewish issue is, for the moment, partially resolved. The order had already been given on August 23, 1941, calling upon all Jews for mandatory registration and wearing of the yellow star. […] The commando has completed the following executions: four hundred male Jews and ten female Jews have been shot as a punitive measure for acts of sabotage or for having been connected to intelligence. I…]. Having been informed of the events, the Kommandant of 72.Infanterie-Division has expressed to the command its recognition and gratitude. The army had placed units at its disposition […].” At his trial, Manstein had to explain why his signature was found on this report concerning the activities of Einsatzgruppe D in Kherson. In an unconvincing way, Manstein asserted that he had not read it; otherwise, he would have demanded that its contents be explained. He then added this completely implausible response: “I never received a report from the SD in which the execution of Jews was mentioned.” However, in the report in question, dated September 12, 1941, Einsatzgruppe D precisely indicated that it had slaughtered 410 Jews. On January 7, 1942, Nazi Einsatzgruppen and German police units massacred an estimated 1,200 Jews in the Crimean city of Eupatoria. As much in his memoirs as during his trial, Manstein laconically asserted that the 1,200 people shot in Eupatoria were armed partisans. Obliged to provide further explanation regarding this matter, he denied having given any sort of order to Major Hans Riesen (???? – ????), the Abwehr liaison in 11th Army, to resort to retaliatory measures. Furthermore, he mentioned that he was hardly troubled by the context in which the executions occurred: “One did not report to me if these partisans had been shot during combat with their weapons in hand or if they had been arrested with their weapons in hand and then later shot. At the moment, it made no difference; our situation was much too serious to think about minor differences such as this.” However, Riesen presented at Nuremberg a completely different version of the facts concerning the massacre in Eupatoria. He declared having been assigned by Manstein himself to execute, as a retaliatory measure, all those who were caught carrying weapons: “I had carried out the retaliatory action under the commander in chief’s order. Doctor Werner Braune (April 11, 1909 − June 7, 1951) was also present […] 1,184 men were chosen and shot.” 90 soldiers from the 11th Army participated in this killing. Apparently, Major Riesen had wanted to entrust the operation to SS-Sturmbannführer Braune, but SS-Oberführer Otto Ohlendorf (February 4, 1907 – June 7, 1951), Kommandant of Einsatzgruppe D, was opposed to it, irritated by the fact that, in his opinion, Wehrmacht officers were constantly looking to pass off onto the Einsatzgruppen military jobs of this type. Braune revealed, for his part, that the executions in Eupatoria had been ordered by Manstein himself, which confirms Riesen’s remarks regarding the full responsibility of the 11th Army’s commander in the massacre of innocent civilians. Even Ohlendorf corroborated the statements of Riesen and Braune, averring that it was truly Manstein who had demanded retaliatory measures in Eupatoria by the execution of all those who were carrying weapons. At the head of a 2nd letter, also signed by Ohlendorf, were found the signatures of Otto Wöhler (July 12, 1894 – February 5, 1987), Stabchef 11.Armee, and Manstein. It pointed out the request from the 11th Army’s commander to obtain for his troops the available watches collected during actions against the Jews: “After a telephone call from the commander of Simferopol, I learned that Herr commander-in-chief in chief had demanded for the army, for professional use, the watches that were available after having been collected during action against the Jews. I hereby forward a hundred and twenty watches to the army, which have since been repaired and are in working order. There are still fifty other watches that are being repaired, a portion of which will be back in working order. If the army needs any more watches, please inform me of it.” Manstein had to explain at his trial why he signed this letter. As was to be expected, his declaration was ambiguous: “Yes, I signed the letter. I believe that it is easy to explain the situation. I asked the responsible officer to procure more watches for me and to speak with the mayor of Simferopol. Simferopol was the largest city of the Crimea, and there were naturally watch stores and repair studios.” He was then asked if he had read the letter, and he responded that even if he had read it, it would never have occurred to him that the watches had been stolen following the execution of the Jews. It is, however, inconceivable that he did not read the contents of the letter, which was only 4 sentences long. In his defense during Manstein’s trial at Hamburg in 1949, the British lawyer Reginald Paget asserted that his client had believed that the commandeered watches were of Swiss fabrication. Such a supposition, claiming that the watches sold in Simferopol’s stores could originally be from Switzerland, especially at this time, was pure fantasy. However, when he had been called to testify at Nuremberg 3 years earlier, Manstein expressed a completely different view. He claimed to have believed that the watches were of German fabrication and that they had been sent directly from Germany. Such a contradiction can only leave us perplexed as to Manstein’s supposed lack of knowledge of the fact that the watches belonged to the executed Jews. Manstein’s comments are revealing, but did not elicit written comment from Paget. They portray an individual, above all, determined to protect the honor of the German soldiers who had fought and died for him—a self-appointed task he initiated at Nuremberg, which would continue throughout his trial in Hamburg and remain an important, if not the key, theme expressed in his memoirs. A crucial matter, therefore, would be to establish how reliable and credible Manstein would be in defending that honor. At the conclusion of the trial, Paget’s closing statements summarized his main arguments aimed at exonerating Manstein from the 17 charges against him. They were essentially based on 3 primary points: 1. the duty of a general was to obey the orders that his government had issued to him; 2. the Hague Convention could not be applied to the war in Bolshevik Russia, for the latter was not an adherent; 3. Manstein was not implicated in any of the war crimes of the National Socialist regime, including those related to the extermination of the Jews. Paget concluded by denouncing the political objective of the trial: “An attempt has been made to tarnish the reputation of the German Army and its greatest commander. When we engaged in battle against the Wehrmacht in Africa, Italy, and in France, it always fought honorably. Because of the Russian propaganda about which we heard so much, we think that the Germans fought like savages in the East. […] This has not been proven by the documents that we presented here. In my opinion, they have demonstrated that the Wehrmacht demonstrated, in large measure, restraint and discipline, and this, under circumstances of unimaginable cruelty.” Implicitly making reference to the context of the Cold War, which was prevailing at the time of the trial and, in particular, to imperatives linked to the defense of Western Europe, notably to West Germany’s envisioned rearmament, Paget asked for Manstein’s discharge: “I hope that we will all become friends in the future. If Western Europe is to be genuinely defended, then we must be friends. I do not believe […] that it is the conqueror’s right, that it is our right, to tarnish the reputation of the vanquished. For Germany, Manstein will never be a war criminal. He is a hero to his people and will remain so. He was the architect of German victory and the Hector in Germany’s defeat, the man who commanded the great retreat while in his heart and in his soul he knew that Troy would fall. And, here, before the tribunal, he has now delivered his last battle for the honor of the men that he led and who fell in combat under his command.” It was a rather surprising fact that Manstein was exonerated by the tribunal for the massive execution of civilians who were labeled as partisans, whereas his comrades-in-arms had been previously sentenced for this same charge during the Oberkommando des Wehrmacht (OKW) trial. Indeed, the tribunal declared that Manstein had absolutely no responsibility for the application of the “Barbarossa decree.” As for the charges concerning the ravages caused by the German Army during its retreat, Manstein was acquitted. Yet he was held responsible for the poor treatment inflicted upon Soviet prisoners of war, for the execution of several among them, for surrendering them over to SD or SS units, and for the execution of Red Army political commissars. The tribunal undoubtedly considered that the execution of commissars was a crime greater than the execution of civilians deemed as partisans and that it deserved to be sanctioned. Finally, Manstein was found guilty of the execution of civilians as a retaliatory measure, as well as for the actions of his subordinate officers who were acting in accordance with orders issued by the Oberkommando des Heeres, but not of those that he had himself set forth. The tribunal sentenced Field Marshal Manstein to 18 years in prison. In light of current historical research on the Wehrmacht’s responsibility in the extermination of the Jews in Eastern Europe, and concerning the massive execution of Soviet political commissars and prisoners, as well as in relation to the poor treatment inflicted upon the civilian population of this region, such a sentence appears quite insignificant. The order of November 20, 1941, issued by Manstein to his troops, was nevertheless fully sufficient to prove his consent and participation in the Jewish Holocaust. The sentence provoked an outcry as much in Germany as in Great Britain. In fact, it would make Manstein nothing less than a genuine martyr. Some in West Germany thought he had been nothing more than a victim of “victors’ justice,” having to endure a collective punishment rather than being personally guilty as a war criminal. The simple fact that he had been tried was perceived as an insult to the honor of the German soldier, for he was considered as being above suspicion. German political leadership feared that the sentence would call into question the foothold that the Republic held in the West. On the British side, public opinion expressed grosso modo the same sentiments, dreading the emergence of a new nationalism in the Federal Republic of Germany, which would weaken her integration into the community of Western democracies. Manstein was incarcerated in the Werl prison for war criminals, close to Dortmund in Westphalia, where 10 other German generals were confined, in particular Field Marshal Kesselring and Colonel General von Mackensen. Manstein had placed at his disposal a secretary to assist in compiling his Memoirs. It should be noted that not a single 1 of the 632 war criminals executed after their sentencing by the British and American tribunals was a general. Those who were executed were all subordinates who, in their trial, had invoked an obligation to obey orders given by their superiors. After a lengthy internal debate, following the outcry sparked by the field marshal’s sentencing, his prison term was reduced to 12 years in February 1950. This, however, did not bring the protests to an end. Indeed, numerous interest groups led a campaign to have Manstein freed, simultaneously provoking a much more widespread debate on German war criminals incarcerated in the prisons of the Western Allies in the Republic. Public interest in Manstein’s fate would thus accelerate the search for a solution to the issue of releasing the former German military elite imprisoned for war crimes. | |
| Image Filename | wwii0970.jpg |
| Image Size | 112.36 KB |
| Image Dimensions | 953 x 1299 |
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| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | August 23, 1949 |
| Location | |
| City | Hamburg |
| State or Province | Hamburg |
| Country | Germany |
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| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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