| Original caption: “Japanese Minister of Education Kunihiko Hashida (right) spoke to German, Italian, and Japanese children about the Tripartite Pact.” Children of Japan, Germany, and Italy meet in Tokyo to celebrate the signing of the Tripartite Alliance between the 3 nations, on December 17, 1940. Japanese Education Minister Kunihiko Hashida (March 15, 1882 – September 14, 1945), center, holding crossed flags, and Mayor Tomejirō Ōkubo (May 12, 1887 – November 19, 1966) of Tokyo were among the sponsors. On September 27, 1940, Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and Imperial Japan signed the tripartite pact in Berlin. The signatories committed to “assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict.” The pact was a warning to the United States not to enter the wars in Europe and China. But the United States Government immediately saw the pact as the formal confirmation of Japan’s belligerence and so increased its military involvement in the Pacific. The tripartite pact built on existing treaties, including the military alliance between Italy and Germany, formalized in the 1939 Pact of Steel, and the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern pact, concluded in 1936 and joined by Italy in 1937. Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia (the latter country albeit only for 12 days) and then the Independent State of Croatia joined the tripartite pact subsequently, but the 3 main signatories denied the accessory states equal rank, thereby perpetuating their idea of a strictly hierarchical world order. Nazi Germany’s non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in late August 1939 had greatly upset the Japanese government. But as the June 1940 defeat of France by Nazi Germany had demonstrated, the defeat of liberal democracy seemed within reach of the Axis powers. The pact’s signing in Berlin underlined Germany’s preponderant position in the alliance at the time. Despite the fanfare, reactions in the United Kingdom and the United States were cool overall. Joseph C. Grew (May 27, 1880 – May 25, 1965), the United States ambassador to Tokyo, drily stated that the pact “may be a diplomatic success for Germany,” but he could not see how Tokyo would benefit from it. In Berlin on the day of the signing, crowds lined the way from the airport to the Reich Chancellery. Reichsminister für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (“Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda”) Joseph Goebbels (October 29, 1897 – May 1, 1945) complained in his diary that Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano (March 18, 1903 – January 11, 1944), had arrived with a 2-hour delay and had undermined the spectacle. The “organized enthusiasm” did not escape the attention of Michele Lanza (June 8, 1906 – November 15, 1973), a young Italian diplomat in Berlin. Ciano found the crowds less enthusiastic than on his previous visits to Berlin, as people knew that the war would not be over soon. But crowds, including youths representing the future, were essential cast, as they suggested strong popular acclaim for the alliance. Lanza mentioned another noteworthy detail in his diary: Ciano had arrived from Munich on Führer und Reichskanzler (“Leader and Reich Chancellor”) Adolf Hitler’s (April 20, 1889 – April 30, 1945) personal plane. This arrangement was a courtesy, but it could also be interpreted as Italian dependence on the more powerful Germany. Goebbels had instructed officials to “set up this visit on a larger scale, but not [to] close businesses” – unlike during Italian Duce and Prime Minister Benito Mussolini’s (July 29, 1883 – April 28, 1945) triumphant 1937 visit to Berlin. Germany had been at war for over a year, and the output of factories was needed for the war economy. Goebbels hoped that the signing would be a major stunt “which would be a heavy blow to [United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston S.] Churchill [(November 30, 1874 – January 24, 1965)].” According to popular opinion reports by the Schutzstaffel SS Sicherheitsdienst (SD – “Security Service”), the German public had reacted with surprise to the conclusion of the pact. They saw it as an omen that Germany would win the war soon, as it was now backed by not only 1 but 2 allies including the powerful Japan. Yet the American correspondent William L. Shirer (February 23, 1904 – December 28, 1993), while absent from the signing ceremony, gave a more realistic verdict. In his view, ordinary people thought that the war would not be over soon. Shirer dismissed the ceremony as a “theatrical performance” that had been put on by the “fascists of Europe and Asia.” Messages of the 3 foreign ministers were broadcast on Italian, German and Japanese radio. The Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka (March 4, 1880 – June 27, 1946), 1 of the key architects of the tripartite pact, had remained in Tokyo, but his radio message gave him the opportunity to portray the geographically distant Japan as politically close to Italy and Germany. The radio messages also symbolized the worldwide reach of the Tripartite Pact and projected technological superiority to global radio audiences, even though the messages from the 3 foreign ministers remained superficial. For instance, in his message to his Japanese and Italian colleagues, Ribbentrop again boasted about the ‘friendship and community of interest’ of the 3 countries. The regimes articulated the imperialist dimension of tripartite diplomacy in mass spectacles which reflected their totalitarian aspiration to mobilize ordinary people. Stage-managed ceremonies expressed the alliance of the Italian, German and Japanese governments, their officials, and their peoples. In Kirin (now Jilin City), the mayor and the Kyowakai, the Japanese “Self-Improvement Association,” a hierarchical mass organization geared towards mobilizing the Chinese population for the Japanese empire, sent a letter to Hitler after the signing of the pact on behalf of the “two hundred thousand citizens.” In the letter, the “people of Kirin” pledged to complete the ‘peaceful unification of the peoples’ and to strive towards a ‘new order of the world’, terms that sounded hollow given the repressive Japanese occupation regime. In Xinjing (now Changchun), the German envoy was disappointed that celebrations had had to be postponed because of the risk of a plague outbreak. Similar reports by German consuls were received from elsewhere in Manchukuo and forwarded to Berlin. Axis performances kept the alliance going. Just before the pact’s 1st anniversary in September 1941, months after Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, Paul Schmidt, in charge of the German Foreign Ministry’s press department, complied a memorandum on how the German media should celebrate the pact’s anniversary. Detailed reports were to stress ‘the traditional friendship between Germany, Italy and Japan’ and gloss over tensions, and not to mention the fact that they were not engaged in a common war. Celebrations of the pact’s anniversaries became a high point in the festive calendar for diplomats and the German, Italian and Japanese publics to maintain the momentum of the tripartite pact. On its 1st anniversary, in September 1941 during the massive Nazi advance in the genocidal war against the Soviet Union, the Japanese, Italian and German heads of government, Prince Fumimaro Konoe (October 12, 1891 – December 16, 1945), Mussolini and Führer und Reichskanzler (“Leader and Reichchancellor”) Adolf Hitler (April 20, 1889 – April 30, 1945), exchanged telegrams whose style and contents had remained formulaic. Key words included the “New Order.” Konoe, leading a country not at war with Italy’s and Germany’s chief enemies the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, remained vaguer in his language. The telegrams by the heads of government were accompanied by a telegram exchange of the foreign ministers. To celebrate the 1st anniversary of the pact, the German government held a reception at the Adlon Hotel, meeting place of Berlin’s high society. A photograph by Heinrich Hoffmann (September 12, 1885 – December 16, 1957), Hitler’s personal photographer, captures the closed ranks between Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop (April 30, 1893 – October 16, 1946), Italy’s ambassador Dino Alfieri (June 8, 1886 – January 2, 1966), both in uniform, and Japan’s ambassador Hiroshi Oshima (April 19, 1886 – June 6, 1975). Ribbentrop, in good form given the German advances on the Eastern front, asked those present, including representatives of new states in the pact’s sphere of influence such as Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, to cheer the heads of states. Alfieri replied with a loud exclamation of “Hail Victory.” Italian propaganda struck a similar chord. For instance, in September 1941, the daily Giornale d’Italia reported “great festivities in all of Japan,” before railing against the United Kingdom. The heads of the main signatories’ governments and their foreign ministers exchanged telegrams, given broad media coverage. In a telegram to Mussolini, part of a broader exchange that kept the Alliance going, Hitler insisted that the Pact would be “the basis of the future new order” which would save “the world from exploitation by alien (raumfremde) powers and the lethal danger of Bolshevism.” As other states in the Axis sphere of influence joined the pact, the performance intensified. For instance, the Nazi press gave ample coverage to Croatia’s accession to the pact in June 1941, months after the German-led invasion of Yugoslavia following the putsch by Serbian officers of the Yugoslav Army against Prince Regent Paul Karađorđević April 27, 1893 – September 14, 1976), who had decided to join the pact in March 1941. To create the illusion that Italy and Germany were equal partners on the European side of the pact, the ceremony was held in Venice’s Doge Palace in the presence of Ribbentrop, Ciano and the Ustaše leader Ante Pavelić (July 14, 1889 – December 28, 1959), a radical fascist and antisemite. Here again, the political leaders were surrounded by crowds. The location had not been chosen by chance. According to the Viennese edition of the Völkischer Beobachter, Venice represented the ‘fates of the Adriatic space of 1 1/2 millennia’ and was a powerful symbol of Italy’s mission to create a Mediterranean empire. In November 1941, the performance of New Order unity continued when Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Croatia, Romania, Slovakia and the Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China, a Japanese puppet state, joined the Anti-Comintern Pact at the “Berlin Congress.” The name was reminiscent of the 1878 Berlin Congress on the future political organization of the Balkans, held in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War, and the 1884-5 Berlin Conference on the imperialist scramble for Africa. While Nazi Germany’s European allies such as Italy and friendly nations such as Finland and Spain provided troops and/or volunteers in this crusade, Hitler – unlike Ribbentrop – rejected Japanese military co-operation against the Soviet Union which some, but not all, Japanese officials in positions of authority such as foreign minister Matsuoka had advocated. With the tripartite pact under its belt, reinforced by the German-Italian promise not to enter into a separate peace with the United States in the eventuality of war, Japan attacked the United States on December 7, 1941. Germany’s and Italy’s declarations of war against the United States followed suit on December 11. Mussolini praised the Japanese as heroic in his speech announcing Italy’s declaration of war against the United States, while Hitler only mentioned the alliance with Japan in passing in his lengthy Reichstag speech. Little to no coordination of military strategy occurred amongst the signatories, despite the January 1942 military convention that was meant to coordinate operational tactics and strategy and to formalize the division of the globe into German/Italian and Japanese spheres of influence. By early 1942, an Axis victory seemed likely. Germany was at the peak of its military expansion in Europe and Japan increasingly dominated East Asia and large chunks of Southeast Asia. No Axis victory materialized, given increasing Allied resistance. Yet the tripartite performance continued and was duly noted in Allied countries. In September 1942, on the 2nd anniversary of the pact, Ribbentrop assembled its representatives and diplomats from new member states at the Kaiserhof in Berlin, Hitler’s preferred hotel until his 1933 appointment as Reich Chancellor. Ribbentrop subjected his guests to a lengthy speech riddled with personal attacks against Roosevelt and Churchill, allegedly marionettes of a Jewish world conspiracy. Ribbentrop did not mention Soviet Dictator and Premier Joseph Stalin (December 18, 1878 – March 5, 1953), Nazi Germany’s arch-enemy, because Japan was not at war with the Soviet Union. The 3 heads of government again exchanged messages over the radio. Nazi propaganda reported this global news exchange with the usual rhetoric, boasting that the “huge victories” had proven that the “aspiring, young nations” had proven their strength. Yamato, an Italian glossy magazine produced under the auspices of Pompeo Aloisi (November 6, 1875 – January 15, 1949), a leading diplomat and president of the Italian Society of Friends of Japan, hit a similar chord in its October 1942 issue. It drew on the familiar antisemitic theme of a Jewish world conspiracy. The “daring” of the soldiers fighting for the pact, the “faith of its peoples” and “the genius of its leaders” would lead to victory against the Western allies whose interests were only material as opposed to Italy, Japan and Germany who were fighting to “establish human relations based on solidarity [and] to liberate international relations (la convivenza internazionale) from the tyranny of gold […].” By that time, Italy’s poor military performance had effectively reduced it to a German vassal state. Boastful declarations on the cover of Il Popolo d’Italia about an imminent victory of the tripartite states therefore were little more than fanciful. Victory rhetoric soon had to be toned down as the Axis, over the course of 1943, proved to be on the losing side in Europe. Massive Soviet victories over Axis troops on the Eastern front were accompanied by increasing Allied mass area bombing of Germany and Italy. Shortly after the July 1943 Allied landing in Sicily Mussolini’s Fascist regime, Nazi Germany’s principal European ally, had collapsed. In early September, Nazi Germany installed Mussolini as head of the Italian Social Republic, a German satellite state in Northern and Central Italy that was formally independent. Thus, a September 1943 German official diplomatic bulletin, distributed worldwide, insisted that the tripartite powers were ‘united for better or worse’ and laid the ‘foundations of a new order in Europe and East Asia’. The 3 regimes had little option but to maintain the performance lest they risk losing face and further undermining their military strength vis-a-vis the Allies. Ribbentrop, Mussolini, in his capacity as foreign minister of the Italian Social Republic, and the Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu (July 29, 1887 – January 26, 1957) exchanged their usual messages on the 3rd anniversary of the signing of the pact in September 1943, which were duly noted by Allied sources such as the New York Times. With an Axis victory ever more unlikely, the performance of unity had to continue. For instance, the Giornale d’Italia reported on September 27, 1943 “great celebrations all over Japan” and insisted that the pact’s objective of a New Order could still be fulfilled if the 3 countries and their peoples intensified their sacrifices. The 3 regimes had coordinated their celebrations of the 3rd anniversary and reinforced the message that the tripartite pact sought a racist New Order. In this vein, the Völkischer Beobachter warned on September 27, 1943, in typical anti-Bolshevik and antisemitic language that the “European workers shall be made unemployed through destruction of their workplaces and thereby [be] made wage slaves of Anglo-American-capitalist or Bolshevik interests.” As the European Axis powers suffered military defeat, Japan, at least until the United States offensives of 1944, still seemed to be on the verge of victory in East Asia and Southeast Asia. In early November 1943, Japan held the Greater East Asia conference in Tokyo to show off its victory over Western colonialism and its goal to create a Greater Asia. In this vision, Japan would dominate but at the same time maintain the independence of Asian nations after Japan had freed them from Western imperialism. The conference raised deluded visions of hope among Japan’s German allies, on the verge of defeat, and Mussolini’s resurrected radical fascist Italian Social Republic. Berlin Rom Tokio boasted in its December 1943 issue that “Greater East Asia takes shape,” brought about by Japan’s “unparalleled triumph.” After the June 1944 Allied landing in Normandy, an Allied victory became ever more likely. The choreographed tripartite friendship had to continue; otherwise, the alliance would have lost its weight. In September 1944, Mussolini agreed to a German request for a special broadcast on the 4th anniversary of the pact. On September 24, a recording of the Duce’s speech was sent to Berlin alongside telegrams addressed to Hitler and Ribbentrop. In the same month, Mussolini, Hitler, and the Japanese Emperor exchanged telegrams on the occasion of the pact’s 4th anniversary, assuring each other of the final victory. Their telegrams were published in the Nazi daily Völkischer Beobachter under the heading Unbeirrbare Siegesgewißheit (“unwavering assuredness of victory”). For the New York Times such histrionics reflected the “Axis’[s] desperation.” These were frantic attempts to keep the momentum of the fractured alliance going at a time when an Axis victory in the war became ever more unlikely. The pact’s signatories could not retract from the pact. In December 1944, German diplomats initiated more celebrations, this time of their joint intervention in the war against the United States, using Japanese naval victories in the Philippines as a pretext to boast about the strength of the pact. With a “final victory” unlikely, German diplomats highlighted the performative aspects of the pact. Accordingly, the “cultural-political” department of the German foreign ministry suggested a celebration with a speech by Großadmiral Karl Dönitz (September 16, 1891 – December 24, 1980), leader of the Kriegsmarine (“Nazi German Navy”). Yet, the Japanese ambassador Oshima demanded even greater bombast. Eventually, a telegram by Hitler to the Emperor Hirohito (April 29, 1901 – January 7, 1989) provided the fanfare requested by the Japanese. Hitler boasted about the “burning conviction of the justness of our common cause” and the fight “until the victorious end,” as he had no alternative but to continue with this friendship performance to maintain the Axis. Nazi fanaticism to fight until the end was accompanied by stories about Japan as a homogeneous, heroic nation whose tough fighting up to the point of self-sacrifice would be an exemplar for Germans to keep pushing back against the Allies. Such discourses about the heroic fighting spirit of the Japanese went back to the 19th century. They were also prevalent in the Italian Social Republic where the radical fascist regime promoted them at a time of declining military fortunes, for instance in a 1944 pamphlet by Generale di Brigata Guglielmo Scalise (February 14, 1891 – November 3, 1975), former Italian military attaché in Tokyo. As the Allies defeated Nazi Germany, followed by the 3rd Reich’s unconditional surrender, the Tripartite Pact ended ignominiously. Since the German government had not given advance warning to their Japanese allies, the Japanese government felt betrayed and suspended the Tripartite Pact, fighting until their surrender in the summer of 1945, almost 5 years after the conclusion of the pact. Hashida, a doctor of medicine, was appointed Minister of Education during Konoe’s 2nd cabinet (July 22, 1940, to July 18, 1941) and 3rd cabinet (July 18, 1941 – October 18, 1941), and Hideki Tōjō’s (December 30, 1884 – December 23, 1948) cabinet (October 18, 1941 – July 22, 1944). He took poison at the surrender and occupation of Japan when Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) accused him of war crimes. Ōkubo was born in Ibaraki Prefecture. He held posts in the Home Ministry and Police Affairs. Ōkubo was Governor of Chiba Prefecture before becoming Mayor of Tokyo in 1939. He was purged by SCAP but reinstated in 1950. Elected to the House Of Representatives 3 times after 1946. Minister without Portfolio in Tanzan Ishibashi’s (September 25, 1884 – April 25, 1973) cabinet (December 23, 1956 – February 25, 1957) and in Nobusuke Kishi’s (November 13, 1896 – August 7, 1987) 1st cabinet (February 25, 1957, to June 12, 1958). This image was internationally circulated in January 1941. | |
| Image Filename | wwii0751.jpg |
| Image Size | 903.83 KB |
| Image Dimensions | 3500 x 2384 |
| Photographer | Tempel Marek |
| Photographer Title | Weltbild, Berlin Dokumentiert |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | December 17, 1940 |
| Location | |
| City | Tokyo |
| State or Province | Tokyo |
| Country | Japan |
| Archive | Archiwa Państwowe |
| Record Number | 2-16047 |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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