| The Allies had realized early in their campaign against the Gustav Line that the historic monastery dominating the summit of Monte Cassino – 1,700 feet (500 meters) above sea level – was a crucial strategic point. Nevertheless, they exempted the monastery, founded in 524 A.D. by Saint Benedict of Nursia (March 2, 480 – March 21, 547), from air, artillery, and ground attacks during the American assaults on Cassino. Even though the Allies later learned that the monastery itself was never permanently occupied by the Germans, frequent sightings of enemy personnel within its walls raised suspicions. In addition, the enemy built heavily fortified emplacements and observation posts within feet of the monastery to take full advantage of the terrain and Allied firing prohibitions. But there was no consensus that the Allied exemption regarding Monte Cassino was wise. 15th Army Group General Officer Commanding United Kingdom Royal Army General Harold Alexander (December 10, 1891 – June 16, 1969) and his superiors had long maintained that the safety of such areas would not be allowed to interfere with military necessity. When New Zealand Royal Army Lieutenant General Bernard C. Freyberg (March 21, 1889 – July 4, 1963) began to plan his assault for the 2nd Battle of Cassino, he concluded that the monastery would have to be reduced and requested air attacks. United States Army General Mark W. Clark (May 1, 1896 – April 17, 1984), Firth Army Commander, Freyberg’s immediate superior, disagreed with this assessment, and he was supported in his view by French General Alphonse Juin (December 16, 1888 – January 27, 1967), commandant des Corps Expéditionnaire Français (CEf); General Geoffrey Keyes (October 30, 1888 – September 17, 1967) II Corps Commander; Major General Fred L. Walker (June 11, 1887 – October 6, 1969), 30-Sxith Infantry Division; and Major General Charles W. Ryder (January 16, 1892 – August 17, 1960), Commander of the 34th Infantry Division. Clark hoped to avoid destroying a historic religious site, and in the process providing the enemy with valuable propaganda. Nonetheless, Clark also wanted to give the New Zealand Corps every possible advantage in jump-starting the Allied drive. In addition, sensitive to the combined Allied command structure in the Mediterranean, he was hesitant to deny Freyberg’s request because of the serious political repercussions that would result if Commonwealth forces later sustained substantial losses. Clark therefore passed on Freyberg’s request to attack the monastery to Alexander and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Sir John A. F. Harding (February 10, 1896 – January 20, 1989). Both British officers decided that if Freyberg thought the monastery’s destruction was a military necessity, the attack should proceed, with Alexander concluding that he had faith in General Freyberg’s judgment. Their opinion was confirmed by General Sir Henry M. Wilson (September 5, 1881 – December 31, 1964), the Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean theater. After making his own position clear, Clark complied with the wishes of his superiors and granted his subordinate’s request. General Freyberg’s decision, widely condemned at that time and since, is still mired in controversy. Freyberg’s plan called for an air attack on the monastery followed by a ground attack by the 4th Indian Infantry Division. This infantry assault would clear Monte Cassino while the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Division forced the Rapido River to the south. Teamed with armored detachments, the 2 divisions would then converge for the drive up the Liri Valley. Freyberg’s request for an air attack, however, was greatly expanded by air force planners, and probably supported by Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker (April 13, 1896 – August 6, 1987), the American Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, and Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers (September 8, 1887 – October 15, 1979), Wilson’s American deputy theater commander. The Americans sought to use the opportunity to showcase the abilities of the United States Army Air Force to support ground operations. Following the dropping of leaflets warning civilians in the monastery to evacuate, the Tactical and Strategic Army Air Forces, consisting of the 319th, 340th, 321st, 2nd, 97th, 99th, and 301st Bomber Groups, began their bomb runs at 0945 Hours on February 15, 1944. A total of 142 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses, 47 North American B-25 Mitchells, and 40 Martin B-26 Maurauders dropped 1,150 tons of high explosives and incendiary bombs on the abbey, reducing the entire top of Monte Cassino to a smoking mass of rubble. Between bomb runs, the II Corps artillery pounded the mountain. The controversial bombing destroyed much of the monastery and its outer walls but did not penetrate the subterranean chambers the Allies thought the Germans were using as bomb shelters. When the 4th Indian Infantry Division launched its attack on the night of February 15, it was repulsed with heavy casualties. Over the next 3 days fighter bombers provided close support of further Indian assaults, all of which failed with tremendous losses. Even though the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Division, aided by 34th Infantry Division and 36th Infantry Division artillery, crossed the Rapido River and made significant headway into Cassino, the heavy losses sustained by Allied units, especially the Indians, forced a halt in operations and a withdrawal from the slopes. In mid-March the Allies attacked Monte Cassino again. The new assault was to coincide with an attack on the town of Cassino by the 2nd New Zealand Division and Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division. The latter units hoped to force a further crossing of the Rapido, capture Sant’Angelo, cut Highway 6, and assist the British 78th Infantry Division to penetrate the Liri Valley. Although most commanders now doubted whether air assaults could reduce the Cassino defenses to the point where the infantry could succeed, a large air attack was nonetheless planned. Successive waves of bombers were to pulverize Cassino between 0830 and 1200 Hours, delivering 750 tons of 1,000 pound (453 kilograms) bombs with delayed action fuses. During the afternoon, every artillery piece on the Cassino front would target the town and provide a creeping barrage for the attacking Indian infantry. On March 15, 1944, Generals Clark, Alexander, Eaker, Freyberg, and Devers watched the air attack on Cassino from 3 miles (5 kilometers) away. On schedule, 514 medium and heavy bombers, supported by 300 fighter bombers and 280 fighters, dropped high explosives on the area. During the afternoon, 746 artillery pieces of British X Corps, the U.S. II Corps, and the New Zealand Corps fired 200,000 rounds, delivering another 1,200 tons of explosives. The bombardment failed to meet expectations. As the infantry and armored units advanced over the cratered and now nearly impassable terrain, they found the German positions still intact and enthusiastically defended. Despite new air attacks by fighter bombers, and another 106 tons of bombs, the New Zealanders and Indians made little progress. Still further air attacks on March 16-17, which dropped 466 tons of bombs, produced no tangible results. By March 21, 7 days into the attack, General Clark called on Freyberg to break off the assault, a decision thought prudent by General Juin and United Kingdom Royal Army General Oliver Leese (October 27, 1894 – January 22, 1978), 8th Army General Officer Commanding, as well. Yet thinking that success was just within reach, Freyberg continued the attack until Alexander compelled him to halt the offensive on March 23. After multiple air assaults, the firing of 600,000 artillery shells, and 1,316 New Zealander and 3,000 Indian casualties, Cassino, Monte Cassino, and the Liri Valley remained in German hands. | |
| Image Filename | wwii0658.jpg |
| Image Size | 749.35 KB |
| Image Dimensions | 3421 x 2506 |
| Photographer | |
| Photographer Title | United States Army Signal Corps |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | February 15, 1944 |
| Location | Monte Cassino |
| City | Cassino |
| State or Province | Lazio |
| Country | Italy |
| Archive | National World War II Museum |
| Record Number | 2013.495.1388 |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
Author of the World War II Multimedia Database