| Reichsmarschall und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (“Reich Marshall and Supreme Commander of the Nazi German Air Force”) Hermann Göring (January 12, 1893 – October 15, 1946), 6th from right, visits Cap Gris Nez, Pas-de-Calais, inspected the building of Siegfried Battery, and met with Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring (November 30, 1885 – July 16, 1960), who was too busy with invasion preparations to really meet with him. Goering’s staff viewed the White Cliffs of Dover, 20 miles (32 kilometers) away. Hermann Goering was confident that September 7, 1940, would be 1 of the greatest days of his life. During the previous afternoon, his special train, “Asia,” complete with private bedroom, study and cinema, had carried him across Germany and the Low Countries towards the northern French coast. He was eager to be present for the final phase of the great battle, and he spent the morning of 7 September touring airfields in the Pas de Calais before proceeding to Cap Gris Nez. from where the White Cliffs of Dover could be seen clearly across the sparkling waves of the English Channel. The Reichsmarschall had dressed for the occasion in his comic-opera powder-blue uniform decorated with yards of gold braid. A lavish picnic was laid out to sustain him while he watched the show, and photographers were on hand to record his moment of triumph. But following Goering’s meeting with his commanders 4 days before, and unbeknownst to Fighter Command, the Luftwaffe’s tactics were about to change radically. On 7 September the target would be Loge, the German codeword for London. Goer-ing’s decision to shift the weight of the attack to the capital was driven by his natural impatience rather than rational calculation. The primary aim of the Luftwaffe was to achieve air superiority. In the preceding days it had undoubtedly done great damage to bases and infrastructure, but there were still many aircraft coming up to oppose the raids. Rather than accept that this was evidence that its intelligence services had underestimated the strength of Fighter Command, the German leadership chose to regard each robust response as the last rally before collapse. Once London was threatened directly, the Royal Air Force (RAF) would have to put the last 50 Spitfires into the fight, which Kesselring confidently assessed were all that were left, and the German fighters could dispose of them in 1 final action. There were also now good political reasons for attacking London. Führer und Reichskanzler (“Leader and Reich Chancellor”) Adolf Hitler (April 20, 1889 – April 30, 1945) had made his wishes clear in his September 4 speech. Britain’s gall in bombing Berlin would have to be avenged, and Goering was anxious to please his master. On the French coast, where Goering had arrived in his special train at Cap Gris Nez and whence the Germans had been broadcasting a running commentary on the passage to and fro of the bombers, there was great exultation. London was in flames, British morale would soon crack now, Fighter Command would now be forced to throw in the last of its reserves, which would be destroyed in the defence of the capital. And then the way would be cleared for invasion. This was the German reaction. And while “retaliation” was no doubt an important motive for the sustained attack on London that had now commenced, the belief that Fighter Command’s reserves would be drawn up to be destroyed in battle was certainly another. Yet this was a mistake almost as serious as the earlier failure to press home the attacks on the radar stations, and it is underlined by 1 comment of Air Vice Marshal Keith Park (June 15, 1892 – February 6, 1975): “On the late evening of September 7, I flew over London on my way back from visiting my battered fighter aerodromes, and I can assure you that the East End of London and the Thames Estuary were a grim sight as a result of the many fires that were burning. However, though I felt very angry, I said ‘Thank God,’ because I realized that the methodical Germans had at last switched their attacks from my vital aerodromes on to cities. I felt confident that we could win as long as I could continue to operate the fighter squadrons.” This was still to be a tough task, successfully carried out only by a hair’s breadth. It was, however, aided by the German tactics of the next few days. For once the Nazi Germans had turned aside from the attack on the Sector Stations, there still remained 2 ways in which he could operate against London. He could continue to throw in the main mass of his attacks by day; this was a costly business so far as his bombers were concerned, 1 bringing only questionable results so far as damage on the ground was concerned, but 1 which might, in spite of these disadvantages, succeed in bringing the fighter squadrons up for destruction in the air. Alternatively, he could make his major attacks by night, a method which brought negligible losses, achieved the maximum destruction on the ground, but which, of course, failed to erode Fighter Command’s strength, since the fighters were for all practicable purposes unable to operate at night. The Nazi Germans put a major effort into night attacks. By starting the now famous Blitz, an operation which has burned itself into London’s folk memory, it compounded their earlier error in turning from the Sector Stations, which played its own vital part in losing the whole battle. On the night of September 7, about 250 bombers droned over London in successive waves, damaging power stations and railways, as well as scores of ordinary homes, and blocking roads with glass and rubble. The process was repeated on the Sunday night, bringing civilian deaths during the 2 nights to about 600 and adding to the chaos through which the Londoner made his way to work on Monday morning. The bombers of the London Blitz returned the next night, and the next and the next — 68 successive nights in all, until, on November 14, London had a temporary reprieve when the Luftwaffe turned to Coventry. During those 68 nights more than 13,000 tons of high explosives were dropped and more than 12,000 canisters of incendiary bombs – minute figures in a nuclear age, but enough to disrupt the life of London and, by bringing a common threat to all its inhabitants, to cause great changes. | |
| Image Filename | wwii0299.jpg |
| Image Size | 349.41 KB |
| Image Dimensions | 2048 x 1416 |
| Photographer | |
| Photographer Title | Kreigsberichter |
| Caption Author | Written or Adapted by Jason McDonald |
| Date Photographed | July 1, 1940 |
| Location | |
| City | Cap Gris Nez |
| State or Province | Pas-de-Calais |
| Country | France |
| Archive | Archiwa Państwowe |
| Record Number | |
| Status | Caption ©2026 MFA Productions LLC Please Do Not Duplicate or Distribute Without Permission; Image in the Public Domain |
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