The Japanese torpedo, called the Long Lance, was vastly superior to the American equivalent. The Americans had tested their torpedoes off Rhode Island, where calm waters were nothing like the combat conditions America's boats would encounter. The heavy seas of the Pacific knocked out the guidance system, and the firing pin was inoperable much of the time, failing to detonate even if the Americans would get a hit. Complaints to the US Naval Command went unheeded. Some American commanders took to modifying their torpedoes themselves, despite orders prohibiting shipboard modifications.
In contrast, when the Japanese submarine I-19 fired five torpedoes, three struck the USS Wasp, which sunk; the USS North Carolina was hit several miles away; and the USS O'Brien foundered after a single hit. Relentless training with the Long Lance was part of every Japanese vessel's orders before the war, and the Japanese considered them part of any tactical doctrine. Every capital ship except some carriers carried them. Thankfully for the Allies, the order to concentrate on capital ships precluded any sort of unrestricted submarine warfare like the war US Atlantic Fleet fought in earnest.
Worse yet for the sub skippers, the high command tried to use submarines for rescue, supply, and covert missions. Aging, large subs like USS Nautilus (SS-168) were used to transport Carlson's Raiders to attack Makin in August 1942. While the raid was a huge public relations success, it had little tactical or strategic value, causing the Gilberts to be reinforced. Subs were very successful as pilot lifesavers, but this took their torpedoes away from hunting the Japanese ships.